The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, With a New Preface [Paperback]

 

 

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Why read a book about ancient Greek warfare? Perhaps, because "classical Greece still offers us the best - perhaps the only intellectual - explanation for how the pragmatic concerns of our own daily existence in Western society have been addressed and solved" (page 7). As you may guess, overall, I enjoyed this book. Professor Victor Davis Hanson is knowledgeable of his subject, writes fairly well and provides some insightful comments. Exactly what one would expect from a good work of military history, however there is something of a bad aftertaste to the work.

To start he takes the famous German historian Hans Delbrück to task for not being "merely wrong, but also misleading" (page 23). He quotes Delbrück as to numbers of troops engaged in ancient battle, but seems to misunderstand the German historian's point. He believes that Delbrück thinks that mass always decide a battle, that the biggest battalions always win, but that is not the point that Delbrück is trying to get across. Rather he is interested in questioning the numbers that are quoted by the ancients. For example, Herodotus records that the Persian army under Xerses numbered 2,641,610 fighting men and at least as many crew members, servants, and camp followers.

Delbrück concluded, based on the actual size of the plain of Marathon and the contemporary estimates of the population of ancient Greece that the Greek army numbered 12,000 men and the Persians, a professional army emphasizing quality, even less. So contrary to Herodotus, the Greeks were not greatly outnumbered, but more numerous, which goes against Hanson's thesis of the overwhelming nature of the Greek phalanx. It should be pointed out that Delbrück is consistent in his questioning of numbers given in the original ancient sources. He also proved rather decisively that Caesar inflated the numbers of his opponents in Gaul for political reasons. Questioning numbers is a part of what is known as Sachkritik, since as Delbrück wrote, "a movement that a troop of 1,000 men executes without difficulty is a hard task for 10,000 men, a work of art for 50,000, an impossibility for 100,000".

In all Hanson unjustly criticises Delbrück, fails to mention, let alone answer, the valid questions he brings up concerning Marathon and then misleads his readers as to Delbrück's true attitude and the quality of his contribution to ancient studies. He then goes on to use Sachkritik, that is Delbrück's own method, in his own historical analysis. As I said, bad aftertaste. . .

Many of the Hanson's own attitudes come out clearly in the work as well, as when he seems to lament that the Greek hoplites may have gone into battle "drunk", that is having had wine with their meal before the battle. This almost caused me to laugh out loud as I was reading the book. Having worked in Europe for almost 20 years I think poor Professor Hanson would be shocked, SHOCKED, to know that hundreds of thousands of Europeans also have wine with their meals and function very well afterwards thank you.

Finally he fails to mention the influence of the rise of the Athenian navy on democracy in ancient Athens, since is was the growing importance of propertyless Athenian sailors, unlike their propertied fellow citizens serving as hoplites who supplied their own expensive weapons and armor, that made Athenian democracy something trully different. This is taken pretty much as a given in historical sociology, but Hanson seems to prefer the hoplites as the limit of his elitest view of ancient democracy, and fails to mention this rather important influence of military technology on social development.

In short, we see influence of highly subjective attitudes and politics in his work which leaves this reader with a bad aftertaste. In all a good book with some interesting comments on the nature of Greek infantry battle, but marred by the author's own rather obvious blindspots.

The other reviews on this book have covered more than I could say. This book, for me at least, led to an eye opening "paradigm shift" in European military history prior to WWI. What I saw in this book was the beginnings of cultural obsession with limited warfare for limited gains (as opposed to the later conepts of total war) which dominated western Europe for millenia. Hence, the Western historians' fascination with "decisive" battles which, ultimately, led not to any decisive change in political or cultural institutions (after all, did Waterloo really change French institutions that much?).

Immediately after reading this book, I read "The Devil's Horseman", a history of the Mongol "Invasion" (it was actually a reconnaisance in force) of Europe. I was struck by the baffelment of the Europeans when, after defeat at the hands of the Mongols, they were not offered some sort of terms of surrender. It struck me, after reading Dr. Hansen's work, that the ancient Greeks had passed on much more to Western society than philosophy, trigonometry, or democracy; they had also passed on an idea of limited warfare for concessions rather than absolute destruction of the enemy and the removal of his capacity to resist.

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in military history; it is well written (although dry at times), and will provide a new viewpoint from which to consider when reading new books or re-reading old favorites. For the insight alone, it is well worth the investment.

Victor Davis Hanson has recently emerged as a particularly right wing columnist at the National Review. However, anyone familiar with his writing there should be aware he is a far better historian than pundit, at least when it comes to Ancient Greece. His basic thesis is that the ancient Greeks evolved a unique form of warfare, focused on a single, short and bloody clash between two armies of citizens. This warfare arose from the circumstances of their society. The typical soldier was an independent small farmer who supplied his own arms and fought as part of a body of amateur citizen soldiers to defend his land and city-state. Generals were chosen from among the citizens and led from the front, sharing risks equally. Conflicts had to end quickly so the farmers could get back to their fields. Consequently, the Greeks developed a style of warfare that emphasized equal risk among soldiers, strength and courage over skill and maneuver, and seeking a decisive battle even at a high cost to their own side. When the Greeks came into contact with less determined cultures, they scored devastating victories. This kind of warfare became the standard for Western armies up into modern times. Hanson further argues that the reliance on citizen soldiers and the emphasis on equality produced a society of democratic, free speaking, free thinking men and ultimately accounted for men such as Socrates and Thuycidides. When small farms started to die out and states began to rely more on professional soldiers, Greek democracy and intellectual life declined as well.
Hanson's work suffers from two flaws, one minor and one major. The minor flaw is that he puts most of his effort into reconstructing Greek warfare and relatively little in demonstrating how that style of warfare dominated Western armies. The focus, as the subtitle suggests is on the Greeks. John Keegan's "A History of Warfare" does a much more thorough job of developing and supporting this thesis (Keegan relied heavily and explicitly on Hanson's work when discussing Greek warfare and wrote the introduction to "The Western Way of War.") Hanson's sentimentality is a far more serious flaw. A farmer himself, he deeply admires the small independent farmers who made up the backbone of Greek armies and society. Consequently he tends to disparage later military developments. For him, the clash of amateur citizen soldiers, with generals leading from the front, is the ideal form of battle. He mocks as cowards and fools Hellenistic era military theorists who shied away from frontal assaults, encouraged generals not to expose themselves to danger and preferred professional soldiers to citizen amateurs. Here he makes selective use of the evidence. By his own account, the professional soldiers of Sparta were regarded as superior and other Greeks feared to face them in battle. Likewise, Xenophon, who had served as a common soldier and was elected an officer by his fellow soldiers, was one of the military theorists who argued against generals risking themselves in battle. Hanson is so fond of the amateur citizen soldier that he seemingly cannot bear to acknowledge that other forms of warfare might be more effective.
Why should anyone in the general public be interested in a book on ancient Greek warfare? The current crisis provides a strong reason. Hanson shows how the Greek way of warfare was integrated into their society and government. A body of citizens decided elections and battle alike as equals. The shift away from amateur citizen soldiers paralleled the shift away from democracy and toward autocratic government. In our current war we are depending heavily on a professional military, rather than citizen soldiers. In previous wars the bulk of troops came from ordinary citizens. Now military service is no longer part of citizenship. As in the time of the Ancient Greeks, there are practical reasons today for relying on professionals. However, there are social costs to such a change. President Clinton's disputes with the military are only the most obvious examples. Hanson reminds us that we cannot easily separate how a society fights wars from how it is governed. There is a sense in his sentimentality. For that alone, his book is worth reading.

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3.0 out of 5 stars Former Western Way of War
Interesting book, but something seems amiss. While the Greek hoplite way of war may have been an impetus, I don't see it as being carried through to modern times. Read more

Published on Oct 24 2003

5.0 out of 5 stars The Origins of Western Shock Combat Technique
In this early work Victor Hanson Davies (VHD) explains what has become his central thesis in military history: The origins and growth of Western military superiority in the art of... Read more

Published on Sep 24 2003 by Roger Kennedy

3.0 out of 5 stars I don't get it
If I were a Greek general in charge of the defense of my city-state, why would I want to stake everything on a decisive battle which might not go my way if my opponents were say... Read more

Published on April 5 2003 by Vietnhi N. Phuvan

5.0 out of 5 stars Hanson's best book emerging the reader into phalanx battle
Hanson historical perspectitive of the Greek City-State wars provides valueable insight into the human suffering, carnage, strategies, and life of the Spartian and Athenian... Read more

Published on Mar 17 2003 by Golden Lion

5.0 out of 5 stars Very Good
Probably the definitive book on the Hoplite, and his ordeal in combat. It's a shame this book is not available; I'm glad I bought it way back whenever I did (I was only able... Read more

Published on May 19 1999

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