Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 [Hardcover]

A full-blooded member of what he calls the "revisionist school" of Vietnam War historians, Moyar firmly believes that America's longest and most controversial overseas war was "a worthy but improperly executed enterprise." His fiercely argued book, which covers the early years of American involvement in the war, is an unabated salvo against what he calls the "orthodox school" that sees American involvement in the war as "wrongheaded and unjust." The main villains are former Vietnam War correspondents David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan; former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge; and just about anyone else who had bad things to say about South Vietnamese premier Ngo Dinh Diem and good things to say about Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh. Though Moyar marshals many primary sources to buttress his political point of view, he undermines his argument by disparaging those he disagrees with (calling Sheehan and Halberstam, for example, "indignant," "vengeful," and "self-righteous"). He also showers praise on those who backed Diem, the autocratic leader who stifled the press and his political opponents. Revisionists will embrace the book; the orthodox will see it as more evidence of a vast, right-wing conspiracy. (Oct. 1)
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This thoroughly researched and richly informative history of the Vietnam War examines first the war's central characters and countries in the years leading up to 1954. Moyar contends that South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, who has been incessantly depicted as an obtuse, tyrannical reactionary by some historians, was in reality a very wise and effective leader. Moyar states that supporting the November 1963 coup was the worst American mistake of the war, that President Kennedy had no plans to abandon his South Vietnamese allies after the 1964 election, and that President Johnson's lack of forcefulness in Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965 squandered America's deterrent power and led to a decision in Hanoi to invade South Vietnam with large North Vietnamese army units. Moyar notes that historians have argued that an American ground-troop presence in Laos would not have stopped most of the infiltration, but much new evidence contradicts this contention. Where the U.S. committed major errors, he writes, was in formulating strategies for defending South Vietnam. A valuable appraisal. George Cohen
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"Thoroughly researched and richly informative....A valuable appraisal."
- Booklist

"A radically revisionist account of America's policy in Vietnam during the years before combat troops were introduced. Based largely on archival sources and Communist histories of the war, this highly provocative work attacks virtually every aspect of what Moyar calls the 'orthodox' historical interpretations of the war."
- Library Journal

"This first installment in a two-volume project may well become the preeminent work in [revisionist history]...Moyar, who has strong credentials (a Cambridge PhD), has an engaging writing style and supports his arguments with dispassionate research... Highly recommended." - Choice

"A revisionist history that challenges the notion that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was misguided; defends the validity of the domino theory and disputes the notion that Ho Chi Minh was, at heart, a nationalist who would eventually turn against his Communist Chinese allies."
- Chronicle of Higher Education

"...this is an important book, a history that serves as a mirror on the present."
- Wall Street Journal

"The book is meticulously documented; it draws on the substantial U.S. documentary record of the war, bringing fresh perspectives to familiar evidence. Moyar augments and supports his analysis with extensive use of North Vietnamese archival material, most of which was unavailable to the orthodox historians of the 1970s and 80s. In sum, Triumph Forsaken is an important book...."
- National Review

"A brilliant young scholar with a Cambridge doctorate who is currently teaching at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Moyar is representative of a small but increasingly influential revisionist school that rejects the fundamental orthodox premise that America's involvement in Vietnam was wrongheaded and unjust.... No review can do full justice to this critically important book. Triumph Forsaken is meticulously documented and bold in its interpretation of the record. Even orthodox historians will be forced to acknowledge the magnitude of Moyar's scholarly achievement. It should, at the least, reopen the debate about America's Vietnam enterprise, reminding us that countries are not destined to win or lose wars. Victory or defeat depends on decisions actually made and strategies actually implemented."
- Weekly Standard, Mackubin Thomas Owens

"Orthodox Vietnam historians, Moyar writes, tend to dismiss revisionists as politically motivated, since the issues surrounding the war, in their view, have long since been settled... Triumph Forsaken throws down a mighty challenge to orthodox historians; they should engage Moyar instead of ignoring him. As they ought to know, truth is its own reward, but it can also be damn practical."
- The American Spectator, Paul Beston

"...impressive and scrupulously researched revisionist history....Moyar's controversial investigation will be challenged by many of the well-respected scholars he confronts in his authoritative account, which elevates the arguments of Vietnam War revisionists to a higher, more respected, level."
- ForeWord

"...[Moyar] has done extensive and careful research in newly available primary sources such as North Vietnamese histories of the conflict. The result is a valuable revisionist study that rejects much of the conventional wisdom about our early involvement in the conflict."
- New York Sun, Guenter Lewy

"[Moyar's] is a complex and well-written account that set the bar high for scholarship. It is essential reading for anyone wanting a fresh understanding of one of America's longest and misunderstood conflicts."
- Marine Corp Gazette

"Moyar's work is an excellent modern read on the Viet-Nam War."
- Military
"The well-researched analysis of policies runs deep, but there's also military analysis and accounts of important military action. This is revisionist history at its best."
-Christian Nelson, VietNow

"Moyar is a fine writer and switches from broad strategic and geopolitical issues to heart-gripping accounts of key military actions...Today's military leaders and policy-makers would do well to ponder this book."
- Leatherneck

"The most noteworthy aspect of Triumph Forsaken is surely the depth and range of its research... Taking him at his word - that he set out to redo the history of the war on the basis of primary sources 'rather than another's filtration and interpretation' of them - Moyar has provided those who take their history seriously with a stunning performance, and plenty to think about."
- Times Literary Supplement

"I know of no scholar more dedicated to bringing a thorough and accurate portrayal of America's involvement in Vietnam than Mark Moyar. Everyone who is interested in a full picture of that oftmisunderstood war should be grateful for his effort."
- James Webb, Marine combat veteran, author of Fields of Fire and Born Fighting

Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides, Triumph Forsaken overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States. The book provides many new insights into the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.

Drawing on a wealth of new evidence from all sides, Triumph Forsaken overturns most of the historical orthodoxy on the Vietnam War. The book provides many new insights into the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and the policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive U.S. troop infusion.

Dr Mark Moyar is the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the US Marine Corps University. He holds a B.A. summa cum laude in history from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in history from Cambridge University. A frequent commentator on historical and current events, his articles have appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and many other publications. He is also the author of Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam.