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Virtual Honeypots: From Botnet Tracking to Intrusion Detection [Paperback]

Niels Provos , Thorsten Holz

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Book Description

July 16 2007 0321336321 978-0321336323 1

Praise for Virtual Honeypots

"A power-packed resource of technical, insightful information that unveils the world of honeypots in front of the reader’s eyes."

—Lenny Zeltser, Information Security Practice Leader at Gemini Systems

"This is one of the must-read security books of the year."

—Cyrus Peikari, CEO, Airscanner Mobile Security, author, security warrior

"This book clearly ranks as one of the most authoritative in the field of honeypots. It is comprehensive and well written. The authors provide us with an insider’s look at virtual honeypots and even help us in setting up and understanding an otherwise very complex technology."

—Stefan Kelm, Secorvo Security Consulting

"Virtual Honeypots is the best reference for honeypots today. Security experts Niels Provos and Thorsten Holz cover a large breadth of cutting-edge topics, from low-interaction honeypots to botnets and malware. If you want to learn about the latest types of honeypots, how they work, and what they can do for you, this is the resource you need."

—Lance Spitzner, Founder, Honeynet Project

"Whether gathering intelligence for research and defense, quarantining malware outbreaks within the enterprise, or tending hacker ant farms at home for fun, you’ll find many practical techniques in the black art of deception detailed in this book. Honeypot magic revealed!"

—Doug Song, Chief Security Architect, Arbor Networks

"Seeking the safest paths through the unknown sunny islands called honeypots? Trying to avoid greedy pirates catching treasures deeper and deeper beyond your ports? With this book, any reader will definitely get the right map to handle current cyber-threats.

Designed by two famous white hats, Niels Provos and Thorsten Holz, it carefully teaches everything from the concepts to practical real-life examples with virtual honeypots. The main strength of this book relies in how it covers so many uses of honeypots: improving intrusion detection systems, slowing down and following incoming attackers, catching and analyzing 0-days or malwares or botnets, and so on.

Sailing the high seas of our cyber-society or surfing the Net, from students to experts, it’s a must-read for people really aware of computer security, who would like to fight against black-hats flags with advanced modern tools like honeypots."

—Laurent Oudot, Computer Security Expert, CEA

"Provos and Holz have written the book that the bad guys don’t want you to read. This detailed and comprehensive look at honeypots provides step-by-step instructions on tripping up attackers and learning their tricks while lulling them into a false sense of security. Whether you are a practitioner, an educator, or a student, this book has a tremendous amount to offer. The underlying theory of honeypots is covered, but the majority of the text is a ‘how-to’ guide on setting up honeypots, configuring them, and getting the most out of these traps, while keeping actual systems safe. Not since the invention of the firewall has a tool as useful as this provided security specialists with an edge in the never-ending arms race to secure computer systems. Virtual Honeypots is a must-read and belongs on the bookshelf of anyone who is serious about security."

—Aviel D. Rubin, Ph.D., Computer Science Professor and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University, and President and Founder, Independent Security Evaluators

"An awesome coverage of modern honeypot technologies, both conceptual and practical."

—Anton Chuvakin

"Honeypots have grown from simple geek tools to key components in research and threat monitoring at major entreprises and security vendors. Thorsten and Niels comprehensive coverage of tools and techniques takes you behind the scene with real-world examples of deployment, data acquisition, and analysis."

—Nicolas Fischbach, Senior Manager, Network Engineering Security, COLT Telecom, and Founder of Sécurité.Org

Honeypots have demonstrated immense value in Internet security, but physical honeypot deployment can be prohibitively complex, time-consuming, and expensive. Now, there’s a breakthrough solution. Virtual honeypots share many attributes of traditional honeypots, but you can run thousands of them on a single system-making them easier and cheaper to build, deploy, and maintain.

In this hands-on, highly accessible book, two leading honeypot pioneers systematically introduce virtual honeypot technology. One step at a time, you’ll learn exactly how to implement, configure, use, and maintain virtual honeypots in your own environment, even if you’ve never deployed a honeypot before.

You’ll learn through examples, including Honeyd, the acclaimed virtual honeypot created by coauthor Niels Provos. The authors also present multiple real-world applications for virtual honeypots, including network decoy, worm detection, spam prevention, and network simulation.

After reading this book, you will be able to

  • Compare high-interaction honeypots that provide real systems and services and the low-interaction honeypots that emulate them
  • Install and configure Honeyd to simulate multiple operating systems, services, and network environments
  • Use virtual honeypots to capture worms, bots, and other malware
  • Create high-performance "hybrid" honeypots that draw on technologies from both low- and high-interaction honeypots
  • Implement client honeypots that actively seek out dangerous Internet locations
  • Understand how attackers identify and circumvent honeypots
  • Analyze the botnets your honeypot identifies, and the malware it captures
  • Preview the future evolution of both virtual and physical honeypots

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Product Description

About the Author

Niels Provos received a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 2003, where he studied experimental and theoretical aspects of computer and network security. He is one of the OpenSSH creators and known for his security work on OpenBSD. He developed Honeyd, a popular open source honeypot platform; SpyBye, a client honeypot that helps web masters to detect malware on their web pages; and many other tools such as Systrace and Stegdetect. He is a member of the Honeynet Project and an active contributor to open source projects. Provos is currently employed as senior staff engineer at Google, Inc.

Thorsten Holz is a Ph.D. student at the Laboratory for Dependable Distributed Systems at the University of Mannheim, Germany. He is one of the founders of the German Honeynet Project and a member of the Steering Committee of the Honeynet Research Alliance. His research interests include the practical aspects of secure systems, but he is also interested in more theoretical considerations of dependable systems. Currently, his work concentrates on bots/botnets, client honeypots, and malware in general. He regularly blogs at http://honeyblog.org.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

This book is about understanding computer security through experiment. Before now, you probably thought that if your computer was compromised, it was the end of the world. But we are going to show you how to look at the bright side of break-ins and teach you to appreciate the insights to be gained from botnets, worms, and malware. In every incident there is a lesson to be learned. Once you know about the many different kinds of honeypots, you can turn the tables on Internet-born attackers. This book discusses a vast range of deployment scenarios for honeypots, ranging from tracking botnets to capturing malware. We also encourage you to take the perspective of adversaries by analyzing how attackers might go about detecting your countermeasures. But first let us set the context appropriately.

Computer networks connect hundreds of thousands of computer systems across the world. We know the sum of all these networks as the Internet. Originally designed for research and military use, the Internet became enormously popular after Tim Berners-Lee invented the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) in 1990 and created the World Wide Web as we know it. As more of us started using the Net, almost all of our social problems transferred into the electronic realm as well. For example, it was human curiosity that created the first Internet worm. (Technically, the first network worm was created in 1982 by Shoch and Hupp of Xerox’s PARC, who developed worms such as the Vampire worm, which would seek out underutilized computers and have them solve complex computing tasks 81. However, in most minds, Internet worms started with Morris, who, among many other contributions, also invented the buffer overfiow.) Scanning networks for the number of installed computers or their respective configuration is another sign of our curiosity. In fact, receiving a constant stream of network probes is nowadays considered normal and expected. Unfortunately, many of these activities are no longer benign. Darker elements of society have figured out that the Internet provides new opportunities to turn a quick profit. Underground activities range from sending millions of spam e-mails, identity theft, and credit card fraud to extortion via distributed denial of service attacks.

As the Internet becomes increasingly popular, its security is also more important for keeping our electronic world healthy and functioning. Yet, despite decades of research and experience, we are still unable to make secure computer systems or even measure their security. Exploitation of newly discovered vulnerabilities often catches us by surprise. Exploit automation and massively global scanning for vulnerabilities make it easy for adversaries to compromise computer systems as soon as they can locate its weaknesses 91.

To learn which vulnerabilities are being used by adversaries (and they might even be some of which we are unaware), we could install a computer systems on a network and then observe what happens to it. If the system serves no other purpose, then every attempt to contact it seems suspect. If the system is attacked, we have learned something new. We call such a system a honeypot. Its compromise allows us to study which vulnerability was used to break into it or what an adversary does once he gained complete control over it. A honeypot can be any kind of computing system. It may run any operating system and any number of services. The services we configure determine the attack vectors open to an adversary.

In this book, we often talk about nefarious computer users who want to break into our honeypots. Many readers might expect that we would call these computer users hackers, a term adapted and distorted beyond recognition by the press. However, the authors prefer the traditional definition of the word: A hacker is a person who finds clever technical solutions to problems. Although there is no shortage of good hackers out there, the supply of people who attempt and succeed to break into computer systems is much larger. We refer to them as attackers or adversaries.

So far, we have claimed that honeypots allow us to study adversaries and gain insight into their motivations and techniques, but now we will prove it to you with a real case study.

A Real Case

This case tells the story of an actual compromise and what we learned from the adversaries. Our honeypot was closely monitored, and we could observe every single step the adversary took on our system. This incident started on April 3, when our Red Hat 8.0-based honeypot was compromised due to weak SSH passwords. The adversary got access to both a user and the root account. She probably considered herself very lucky to have gained access to a high-speed university network. What she did not know was that we had intentionally installed guessable passwords. (Evil grin.) Actually, this kind of attack is quite common. If you run an SSH server yourself, just take a look at its log files.

Using our log files and other information gathered on the honeypot, it was easy to reconstruct the series of events that took place. As in many movies, the attack took place in the middle of the night. Originating from a university host in Norway, the adversary initiated an attack against the honeypot’s SSH server shortly after midnight. Her automatic tools cycled through many thousand different user names and passwords before she got lucky and guessed the root password. With complete and unlimited access to our system, the adversary, arriving from an Italian IP address this time, downloaded several tools from different web servers to facilitate her malicious actions. Among these tools was an SSH scanner, an IRC client, and a root kit. Not surprisingly, our adversary used the SSH scanner to find more Internet systems with weak passwords. In addition to the root kit, a back door was installed to allow the adversary to come back at any time without anyone noticing. When the adversary was downloading the movie Get Rich Or Die Tryin’ (Spanish), we decided that things had gone on long enough, and we shut down the honeypot.

Attack Timeline

Our in-depth investigation produced the following timeline of events:

00:23:07 AM: After several minutes of scanning, the adversary manages to log in for the first time, utilizing the guest account. Not satisfied, the adversary continued to guess passwords for further accounts.

00:35:53 AM: Jackpot! Successful login in as root. However, despite getting root, the password guessing continues—a strong indicator that we are looking at a completely automated attack.

00:51:24 AM: The user guest logs in but logs off a few seconds later. We assume that the adversary manually verified the correctness of the automatically guessed user names and passwords.

00:52:44 AM: The user root logs in, but this time from the IP 83.103.xxx.xxx. While logged in, three new users are created. All of them with group and uid 0, the identity of the system administrator.

00:54:08 AM: The intruder logs in using the guest account and changes the password for this account. She then starts downloading a file with her tools of trade from a remote web server.

00:54:29 AM: The file completes downloading. It contains an SSH scanner, shell scripts to start it, and two dictionary files to generate user names and passwords. Ten seconds later, files xyz and 1 are downloaded as well. File xyz is another dictionary file for the previously mentioned SSH scanner. File 1 is a simple shell script, which facilitates the proper execution of the SSH scanner.

00:54:53 AM: The adversary initiates an SSH scan against the IP range 66.252.*. The scan finishes after about three minutes. Don’t worry: Our control mechanisms prevented any harm to other machines.

00:58:18 AM: The guest, george, and root users log out.

01:24:34 PM: User george logs back in, this time from IP address 151.81.xxx.xxx. The adversary switches to the root account and starts downloading a file called 90. A quick analysis reveals that it is some kind of kernel modifying program, probably a root kit.

02:22:43 PM: Another file is downloaded, and the adversary also changes the root password. The new file contains a modified SSH server that listens on port 3209 and another SSH scanner. From now on, all connections to the honeypot were made through the freshly installed back door.

02:23:32 PM: The adversary establishes a connection to the mail server mta238.mail.re2.yahoo.com but fails to send an e-mail due to improper formatting of the MAIL FROM header.

02:31:17 PM: The adversary downloads mirkforce.tgz, which contains a modified IRC client. A moment later, she executes the IRC client and connects to an IRC server running at 194.109.xxx.xxx.

02:58:04 PM: The adversary attempts to download the movie Get Rich Or Die Tryin’ via HTTP.

03:02:05 PM: A whois query is executed for the domains bogdan.mine.nuand pytycu.ro.

04:46:49 PM: The adversary starts scanning the IP range 125.240.* for more machines with weak SSH passwords. She stops scanning at about 05:01:16 PM.

04:58:37 PM: She downloads the compressed file scanjapan.tar to the /tmpdirectory. The file contains another SSH scanner with Japanese user name and password dictionaries.

05:30:29 PM: It was time to go home and have a beer, so we shut down the honeypot.

Once the incident was over, we had plenty of time to analyze what really happened. We saved copies of all tools involved and were able to determine their purpose in detail. For example, the installed root kit was called SucKIT and has been described in detail in Phrack, issue 58 78. SucKIT is installed by modifying kernel memory directly via /dev/kmemand does not require any support for load-ab...


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Amazon.com: 5.0 out of 5 stars  13 reviews
9 of 9 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars The best place to start. Sept. 2 2007
By samuel F. stover - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
Quick disclaimer: I know both authors. That said, I still have no problem pimping this book as "THE BEST PLACE TO START if you want to learn how to use honeypots." Best. Bar none. Par excellence - pick your cliche.

The fact is that these guys have pulled together an immense amount of experience into a book that will have you running your own honeypot in short order, and that's no small task. Setting up a honeypot/honeynet properly is *not* trivial. Tools like honeywall and argos are not for the faint of heart. But with VH, you'll have what you need to get started and most likely succeed.

Beyond the practical (i.e. step-by-step instructions on how to get things working), there is also plenty of theoretical. There truly is something for everyone in this book. Loads of info on low-interaction vs. high-interaction honeypots, plus legal and ethical points to consider for the budding honeypotter.

The proof is in the pudding for me - I now use argos to capture vulnerabilities in the wild, as well as sebek/honeywall/vmware to research worm propagation. I probably would have gotten there without this book, but certainly not as fast. Kudos to the authors - great book guys.

~SfS
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Honeypots made easy Nov. 10 2007
By Chris Gates - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
Books that put institutional knowledge, or knowledge that people in the industry know but its not written down anywhere, are few and far between. This book succeeds in taking that institutional knowledge and putting it into a readable, functional, and well-organized format.

Before I get into the chapter play by play stuff, let me just say that Chapter 8, Client Honeypots, is worth the price of the book. Client-side attacks are were everything is moving to and the days of a remote OS 0day or quickly fading away. One of the hardest things to automate and teach is client-side attacks because it used to involve user interaction (someone actually clicking on the email, link, .exe), but with the client honeypots they discuss in the book you can automate clicking on emails, clicking on links, spidering websites, and running the executables you download from the sites. You can also monitor your honeypot for changes after running the executable, good stuff!

Most of the other reviewers said you can skip the introductory material, and you could, but its better than the usual "beginning of the book/background" material. The book starts with honeypot/honeynet introduction. Chapter 2 covers high interaction honeypots to include a good chunk of information on VMware and your other "virtual" options including User Mode Linux and Argos. Chapter 3 covers Low interaction honeypots like LaBrea, GHH, and PHP.HoP for your web based low interaction honeypots. Chapters 4 & 5 are a healthy dose of honeyd. Chapter 6 is collecting malware with Nepenthes and Honeytrap. Chapter 7 covers Hybrid systems. Chapter 8 is, as discussed, Client Honeypots. Chapter 9 is on detecting low and high interaction honeypots. Chapter 10 contains Case Studies, Chapter 11 is Tracking Botnets, and Chapter 12 closes out the book with analyzing malware with CWSandbox.

My only gripes about the book were that they failed to talk about persistent versus non-persistent modes in VMware and there as no discussion of identifying VMware and Sebek in Windows. Configuring your virtual machine how you like it, then setting it to non-persistent is a great way to let users or attackers do whatever they want to the OS. The changes survive an OS reboot but if you reboot the virtual machine it goes back to the original state, very handy. The other gripe was a shortage of material on detection of Sebek on Windows hosts, its covered in-depth for Linux though. Detecting VMware and some other honeypot type tools like Sebek in Windows is fairly easy. Simply querying for their respective registry keys usually does the job :-)

Overall, a good book. Its useful, up-to-date, and relevant to security today.
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars A breakthough work Aug. 21 2007
By Stephen Northcutt - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
Simply put, this is the best security book I have read this year. A perfect blend of well researched information about honeypots as well as plenty of pragmatic how to do it. Well known respected authors that clearly know their stuff. A nice blend of network and system information to give the read the full picture. The reader will learn a lot of analysis and be exposed to a number of attack signatures. And the information is applicable. That was the huge eye opener for me! I thought honeypots were boutique at best, but the book shows clearly how to use them to augment your intrusion detection capability, to detect malware and to identify botnets. At the exact second the Storm botnet is raging, anti-malware products from Symantec, NAI, Trend Micro just are not getting the job done. A large organization with a low interaction honeypot like honeyd, collapsar or potemkin would be able to track what is happening in their network. In the same way, if you are running nepenthes or roleplayer you can identify (detect) the malware and understand how it is working.

Obviously the book cannot cover each tool in depth, Virtual Honeypots goes into detail for honeyd and nepenthes and serves as a manual to help you get started. This is thrilling reading to the very end, the final three chapters are case studies ( war stories ), tracking botnets and working with the CWSandbox. I absolutely recommend this book and expect that I will keep it near my workstation for the next few months. I read it the first time on airplanes, I live in Hawaii so each trip to the east coast is ten hours airplane time and it took about 20 hours for me to work through the book. I plan to read it at least one more time, but with a computer nearby to try to apply some of this. Hats off to the authors, Provos and Holz for sharing their knowledge with the community.
4 of 4 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Most comprehensive information about Honeypots. Aug. 27 2007
By Timo - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
This book provides the most complete overview of Honeypots. It includes very detailed instructions on how to set up and use tools, and gives many examples for analysis and deployments. I have personally heard about Honeypots a lot, but never set one up myself. This book provided an excellent tutorial to show me how to do it. For both experts and novices, this book is filled with useful information. A must-read for anyone interested in Honeypots & malware simulations in general.
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent, modern book on digital defense Jan. 7 2008
By Richard Bejtlich - Published on Amazon.com
Format:Paperback
It's fairly difficult to find good books on digital defense. Breaking and entering seems to be more exciting than protecting victims. Thankfully, Niels Provos and Thorsten Holz show that defense can be interesting and innovative too. Their book Virtual Honeypots is your ticket for deploying defensive resources that will provide greater digital situational awareness.

A security technician with some degree of proficiency should be able to read Virtual Honeypots and then implement at least one of the solutions presented. This sounds like a fairly common event, but too often technical books do not provide the detail required to transform theory into practice. Virtual Honeypots offers installation and operational guidance for a variety of deception and analysis systems, primarily for server-oriented technologies. I especially gained a better understanding of Honeyd and Nepenthes, the two applications about which I cared the most.

While I liked the first 2/3 of the book, I have to say I really enjoyed the last four chapters. These covered Detecting Honeypots, Case Studies, Tracking Botnets, and Analyzing Malware with CWSandbox. Of these the final chapter was superb. Ch 12 has probably the clearest explanation of hooking I've read anywhere. I am not a rootkit writer or Windows kernel programmer, but the text was so well written I had zero problems following along.

I gave Virtual Honeypots five stars because it is so unique and well-written, but I do have a few minor issues to mention. First, I was somewhat disappointed by the honeyclients section (ch 8). I was not as confident that I could implement a honeyclient solution after reading the great material on server-oriented honeypots. Perhaps the second edition or a separate book will give greater attention to this area. Second, I found a few small technical items. On p 4, it isn't accurate to say "TCP...[gives] each packet a sequence number." Bytes of application data are numbered, not packets. On p 13 we are told to use a snaplen of 1500 bytes, but this will cut off the last 14 bytes of many Ethernet frames. Try it with ping -s 1472 while sniffing with Tcpdump. As you can see, these minor issues are easily fixed in a future printing and do not justify dropping a star.

If you are at all interested in potentially deceiving intruders, buy and read Virtual Honeypots. You'll learn about more than VMware (QEMU, UML, etc.) as well as numerous open source tools you can download and try for free. I look forward to reading more from these authors -- perhaps a book of true case studies?

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