Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War [Hardcover]

The Reagan administration gave the Bush administration an unique opportunity to reduce arms. The Bush administration did not continue the Reagan administrations views on foreign policy with Gorbachev. The Bush administration would stop and the continuation of the Reagan summits ceased and Bush would contemplate the previous administrations philosophy and direction with disagreement. The Bush administration would take a broad interpretation of the ABM. The transition between the Reagan and the Bush administration would treat the ARM reduction opportunity like a hostile take over, replacing Shultz and Weinberger with Bush people, and resume deterrence buildup policy. Bush's differed in his view of foreign policy, not willing to take Reagan's hardline position. Bush felt Reagan's hardline rhethoric was offensive to the Soviet leadership. Reagan had openly challenged Gorbachev on issues of human rights condemning the violence. Reagan called the Soviet Union the "evil empire". Reagan's hardline position postured the United States as one of military strength, 3 to 4 percent increases for SDI, and a estimated cost of 1.6 trillion dollars to deploy SDI; inconsistency in reporting and engineering feasiblity of the chemical and X-Ray laser brightness (Daniel Graham and Teller) as a military weapon; economic drives to reduce military spending, balance the budget, and reduce inflation. Reagan's NORAD vision prompted his to dream of a defensive system capable of making the Soviet ICBM impotent eliminating the potential of first strike. Reagan realized "Mutal Assured Destruction" did not stop a first strike response, it only deterred; and with the Soviets considering the possiblity of winning a nuclear war, defensive missile systems needed to be engineered and deployed immediately. Moscow media was warning of the possiblity of U.S first strike. The fear was caused more by a pattern of military buildup than an particular doctrine. The nuclear arms races of the cold war positioned the U.S in a potential first strike position. ARM reduction talks were a mandatory must.

Gorbachev as General Secretary was considered trustworthy, known as "incorruptable and courageous", by Soviet leadership too secure Soviet communist interests and start reform leading too social and economic structural revolution of the soviet union paving a pathway for Marxist views of property rights, freedom of press and speech, primary elections, openings for foreign investment and transplating of foreign companies, free markets and free trade, and the arms reduction. Gorbachev would raise to the status and power of President. Boris Yeltsin was critical of Gorbachev. Gorbachev would not be able to break from Russia's totalitarian past. Yeltsin would be eventually elected as president. Yeltsin would struggle with reform against the hardliners and failing expectations of previous era's. Yeltsin would face the struggle to a market economy: failure of taxation, hyper inflation shock to lifting price controls, and problems with stablizing privatization.
Gorbachev received a standing obviation from the U.N. after a fifteen year soviet absence caused by Brezhnev condemning speech against the U.N. Gorbachev seemed different from other Soviet leadership and Margret Thatcher seemed to agree. Gorbachev return to the U.N signals a change in Soviet strategy. The strategy did not deviate from the goal of world domination.
Gorbachev proposed an unique idea, "the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons by 2000" and social change for the Soviet Union. This vision would make Gorbachev, man of the year, according to Times news. The reduction of 50,000 missiles. Was the offer pragmatic and realistic? Reagan never did buy into a 100 percent arms reduction nor believe in negotiate from a position of weakness. Reagan had forced the confrontation by building up the NATO missile arsenal.
The soviet military economy was bankrupt and the financial drain at a crisis level, social change was inevitable: the actual missile growth rate was lower than Soviet Analyst had originally reported, Soviet satelite terrorities conflicts could not be assured intervention, and Gorbachev would start Perestroika changing the face of communism. "Perestroika stimulate human initiative and creativity within the Leninist/Stalinist paradigm." Reagan exploited this weakeness and put the U.S in an unique negotiating position.
Reagan spoke to students at the Moscow University telling them they were part of a great change in their country and had the responsibility to ensure the change was successful. The U.S Soviet talks started at the same time: the Iran-Contra scandal with North and Ponidexter (arms/drugs for hostages); and the Chernobyl disaster forcing the evacuation of a hundred thousand people.
Reagan, Collin Powell, and Shultz formed a tight negiotating team advising Reagan on tactics and strategy during talks with Gorbachev. Shultz work with Sheverdnadze opened up allowed talks to open between the two countries. Powell was very aware of Gorbachev's skill in debate and couched Reagan on counter tactics: more one on one private discussion, type double space notes for Reagan to follow, and maintaining control of the conversation. Gorbachev was a tough negiotator, who knew his facts and Soviet interests and he came prepared and should not be under-estimated.

Reagan hardline rhetoric, love for America, and empathy put him one of the most unique negotiating positions in the world history: the position of achieve a realistic arms reduction. Eventually, Gorbachev would propose over a 1400 soviet missile and 429 U.S missile reduction and the beginning of START and condition SDI to stay in research phase only. The proposal could not be accepted. SDI research would continue through the Bush administration into the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration would provide the greatest chances for SDI deployment. Other deteriant missile types were conceived, such as small and light smart missile providing a defensive shield from space that cost hundreds of thousand of dollars rather than millions. The greatest challenge to the ABM technology was that Soviets missile changed from liquid fuel to solid fuel causing and increased variance in speed, obsoleting missile interceptor technology. Continual adaptions in Soviet missile technology threaten the security confidence.

The nuclear threat has not gone away. Topol M under the ABM treaty again challenges our perception of a defensive shield against an adaptive missile technology capable of confusing satelite tracking and mid flight navigational variation designed to avoid destruction by ground interceptor missiles. The need for defensive missile is as real today as in Reagan's era.

Other personality discussed in the Book were Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Weinberger, Meese, and Baker.