Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk Of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century [Paperback]

McNamara fills the book with interesting stories about his time as Defense Secretary and I found these items the most enjoyable of the book. He covered a good deal of information on his view of the Cuban Missile crises and why we got into Vietnam in the first place. If there is value in the book then this is where it was. Overall the book was well written, except the prolog, and easy to read. The authors expressed their views well and with conviction. It was just that I kept thinking that this is never going to work in the real world. I would agree with another reviewer here that if you are looking to just get the highlights of the book chapter five is the place to start and finish.

An analysis of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson vision for the 20th century in the aftermath of the First World War serves as a starting point. The authors endorse Wilson's realization of the unimaginable disaster that awaits humanity if we do not create the climate and institutions for peace. They also admire his moral approach, his notion of peace without defeat, and his multilateral approach envisioned in the League of Nations.

However, there is also Wilson's ghost - his promotion of fragmenting national self-determination, his sometimes patronizing moralism, and his failure to persuade the Senate and the American people to abandon a unilateral approach to foreign affairs.

McNamara and Blight adopt two imperatives. The moral imperative for U.S. foreign policy is to avoid in the 21st century the carnage caused by conflict in the 20th century. The multilateral imperative is to refrain from using our economic, political, or military power unilaterally, other than in defense of the United States itself.

The authors suggest three steps as essential to securing peace in the 21st century. First, we must prevent great power conflict. This can only come if we truly seek to understand and appreciate the perspectives of other nations, especially Russia and China - what the authors call empathy.

Second, we must reduce communal killing by intervening in "dangerous, troubled, failed, murderous states." This would involve a standing United Nations pacification military force of at least 10,000 trained troops on stand-by for immediate mobilization. It would also involve planning and cooperation with other nations that understand the roots of the conflict or have interests in the region. It would involve taking sides in conflicts on the side of human rights and the realization that it might take years, even decades, to stabilize a war-torn area rather than go for a quick fix. Finally, the policy would involve realization of the limits of military force in resolving some conflicts, that is, a realization that sometimes, external force only makes matters worse.

Third, the policy should be to avoid nuclear catastrophe by "moving steadily and safely to a nuclear-weapons-free world. The authors are realistic. In a world with no nuclear weapons there would always be the danger of cheating or breakout from nuclear restraints. However, the dangers of the present situation with thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert far surpass the dangers in a weapons-free world. The authors argue, that no matter how long it takes, our policy objective must be total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The book is somewhat repetitious. If you want the gist of the argument, go to the ten-page chapter 5 "Reducing Human Carnage, An Agenda for the 21st Century." On the other hand, McNamara's extended comments on the decision making involved in the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War greatly enhance the value of this volume.

A sobering and challenging book that we would all do well to ponder.