Commentaires client les plus utiles
|
|
3 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile :
3.0étoiles sur 5
Misleading Title -- More Like a History of Religion, Nov. 15 2009
Karen Armstrong is a brilliant, thoughtful and highly educated writer. Based on the title of this book, I hoped that she had written a response to the New Atheists (Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, Dennett). But no. Instead, Armstrong has written more of a history of religion, with a very small amount of argument/response. Her book reminded me very much of Robert Wright's recent "Evolution of God." Both books trace the history of religious thought from pre-historic times to the present. Overall, Wright's version is more interesting and readable, but Armstrong's version is not bad.
|
|
|
2 internautes sur 3 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile :
4.0étoiles sur 5
Where is god?, Nov. 4 2009
This book is an answering salvo--a long one--to the contemporary flurry of atheist assessments of religion. It is an almost perfect illustration of the curious fact that both sides in this debate argue straight past each other: neither seems to engage with the aspects of the argument that the opposition holds most dear. A bit like a hummingbird trying to have a conversation with a whale.
Armstrong writes fervently about her idea of 'god', developing a portrait through history from an eclectic bunch of traditions: the Eleusinian mysteries, Socrates, Jewish rabbinical scholars, the Greek Fathers of the church, Muhammad, Aquinas, medieval mystics, and Kepler. She sees the most sophisticated human conception of god as rooted in religious practice--rites and devotions--which lead to a kind of psychological transformation, an opening of the personality to escape the bounds of selfhood and selfishness, a kenosis or 'emptying-out' of the self which brings a profound awareness of the limits of human knowledge and becomes 'unknowing'. Beyond all knowledge is 'god', who is 'absolute unknowability', of whom it is impossible to form any predicate, even that of existence. This essentially mystical training and mental attitude is then, in the the most vague and general of terms, assumed to lead its practitioners to embody gentleness, truth and justice to all. Perhaps it is coarsening the argument to suggest that this in effect makes 'god' simply the goal of meditative exercises: a psychological sensation which fulfils some obscure part of our nature. As others have noted, one problem is that this bears very little relation to what almost everybody else means by 'god', and almost no relation at all to any organized religion. Armstrong is completed uninterested in whether or not her god exists external to the meditating mind: he is beyond such categories as existence. God apparently makes no rules, prescribes no rites. He does not have views on stem cell research, sexuality, or the stoning of unbelievers; he cannot even help us with such mundane ethical questions as whether it is right to hold down a screaming child so that a physician can vaccinate it.
Historians and medievalists might take exception to the cherry-picking of the harmonious bits of the various traditions. To read Armstrong on Aquinas, for instance, would never lead a reader to suspect that he was the same thinker who carefully sorted out all the degrees of sin involved in the different possible partners in fornication (virgins, the married, vowed religious, same-sex, baptismal sponsors), and argued that one of the joys of the blessed in heaven would be the contemplation of the tortures of the damned in hell.
As the book draws towards the modern period it becomes much more unbalanced. Armstrong argues that the true notion of god became lost in the Enlightenment, when religion became more 'rational', and hence most modern religions have allowed themselves to be contaminated with science. Instead of insisting that their realm is entirely 'other', they wish to be seen as saying true things about the actual world (as in Creationism), and this literalism has led them to be outflanked by the biological sciences. (For some reason, Armstrong considers physics to be much closer to her mystical truth.)
But it must be said that, in defending her idiosyncratic idea of god, Armstrong grossly misrepresents Dawkins and the modern atheist scientists. She doesn't really have any time for the phenomena of this world; Dawkins' eloquent delight in the the variety of nature is countered by her lofty Platonic scorn. In fact Dawkins has no objection to people practicing mysticism or religion: but he feels strongly about people confining others with rules, restrictions and sanctions on purely religious grounds, and is infuriated by those who would propagate flat lies to children in the pretended name of science.
So Armstrong provides a detailed and fascinating exploration of mysticism, ritual, and the justification for 'spiritual' practices, and makes a plea for their deep-rootedness in human nature, and their value in developing a certain kind of human potential. So much seems entirely valid. But those who want to understand the world around us, and work out sensible rules to live by, might find her thesis frustrating and baffling: nebulous sub-rational navel-gazing and egotistic self-absorption. In the confrontation with modern atheism there are two entirely different discourses going on: one focussed inwards to the self, one outwards to the world. Armstrong is not arguing for the existence of god but for the existence of the idea of god, a deep psychological capacity in man; the biological scientists are asking for an accurate assessment and understanding of the diversity of physical living things. One side delights in paradox, mystery, language that negates itself; the other rejoices in measurement, logic, clarity and physical results. How can you measure an O altitudo! against the cure for smallpox? They should really leave each other alone.
|
|
|
5 internautes sur 8 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile :
2.0étoiles sur 5
A critical failure, Nov. 8 2009
Armstrong's title is not even helpful to position her or for informing her potential reader. This text could be titled "A wayward defence of theistic texts." The allegorical value of theistic texts provides no greater allegorical value than any other literary text. This book is not a case for deism, but a case for theism. The bible, torah, qur'an, etc. may contain value, but none of them carries authority, nor do the values therein supersede the value of any other text. I disagree that this text "demolishes" Dawkins. It doesn't address Dawkins' problem with deism. Instead, it circumvents this address by valorising narratives. Save yourself the cash by borrowing a bible: read it as the wild narrative that it is then put it back.
|
|
|
Commentaires client les plus récents
|