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2.0 out of 5 stars
...and this guy's on the president's bioethics panel?!, Jan 11 2004
I guess someone has to play the job of the paranoid futurist and Fukuyama has done a great job of it in the past. Here, he is no better. His aim: the biotech industry. His worry: biotech threatens human dignity. His arguments: (?)I bought this book after seeing him on a C-SPAN panel discussion and he seemed quite balanced. Myself seeing nothing wrong with biotech (and being puzzled at the 'human dignity' arguments), I am still willing to hear good arguments to counter my own. I thought this would be the book. It was not. The first section of the book is a rehash of the developments and techinical information needed to make a meaningful discussion of biotech. Here, Fukuyama gains both his stars. He was clear, concise, and he even managed to say in one sentence what I've seen others say in 2 paragraphs, and more comprehensively. Being familliar with a lot of this info from past readings, a lesser writer may have caused me to skip over the chapters. Even though I'd read most of the info before, reading it in Fukuyama's words was exciting. Then there is the second, decidedly more philosophical section, where the author discusses first, human rights, and second, human dignity. Here, we see that Fukuyama is truly "Aristotle's bulldog". He first makes a(n almost irrelevent) case for natural rights. How does he do it? Surprise, suprise: humans have natures; those natures are (with minor variance) universal: therefore, human rights exist. He tells us that "ought" actually can be derived from "is". But here is the problem. Fukuyama is very selective in what he recognizes as human nature. Many prominent biologists have shown that brutish things like revenge, rape, infanticide, and bluffing (via game theory) are also part of our universal natures. Should we recognize them as rights too? Fukuyama, oddly, is silent. (somme other reviewers have made astute critiques of his "natural rights" proofs). While I think that 'oughts' should be made with 'is's' in mind (judgments should be INFORMED by fact), Fukuyama (and other natural rights theorists) must unavoidably be selective in what parts of our natures to count as 'natural rights' and which not to. These are value judgments and ones based almost unavoidably on PRIOR conceptions of what is desirable. Therefore, "is" to "ought" is not a necessary step, but a highly 'unnatural' moral leap. (Oddly enough, Fukuyama quotes Hume saying exactly this, never quite rebutting him. Hume, it turns out, makes the stronger case!) From there, we talk about human dignity. I certainly agree with Fukuyama on two points: first, science has had a nasty tendency to (somewhat sadistically) make statements "degrading human dignity". Instead of being the third chimpanzee (an oversimplification to say the least), we are "JUST (read: only or merely) the third chimpanzee. Similarly Richard Dawkins likes to say that we are survival machines BLINDLY programmed by our genes to ensure their, not our, survival. The second area that I agree with Fukuyama is that science has made it appear that since we are made of the same stuff as other animals, that we are really not much different from them. This ignores obvious empirical evidence that even if we have the same emotions as, say, bonobos, we not only have more of them, but we can do such things as supress them, learn about them, modify them (fairly quickly) and be aware of them in a second-order way. Fukuyama, then, is right on these two counts and becuase of both of them, science has appeared to threaten our human dignity. Where he is not correct is on the conclusions he draws from is: that biotech DOES threaten our dignity. If our natures can be manipulated, he says, then there is really not much special about us at all. My answer: only if that is the way YOU want to think of it, but your conclusion doesn't necessarily follow. After all, we can control diamonds: we can cut them, color them, crush them into powder, chisel them to our specs; but does that make a diamond less valuable to us? No. So if I were to engineer my daughter prior to birth to try and ensure that she is as healthy or has the 'best brain' possible, does that diminish her future high score on the SAT's? I highly doubt she will really think of it as my, and not her own, achievement. Fukuyama also assumes that we will be able to genetically engineer to ensure our children are succesful in life. Hmmm....I thought environmental factors played pretty important roles in ones 'succcess' (whether you've the right business partners, whether consumers like your ideas, whether you are in the right place at the right time with the right people...etc.) There is a third section that takes his 'arguments' and applies them to public policy debates where his ultimate stance is to put serious regulations on cloning and biotech. I found this section only skim-worthy, as they rely on the faulty argumenets in previous sections. I generally don't write long reviews, but there are honestly so many fallacies, over-simplifications, and unrealistic speculations in this book (not much of a departure from The End of History)that writing a short one would feel wrong. My suggestion? Read the book, but do so skeptically. A better book explicating the same kind of fears but with better arguments? "Human Cloning and Human Dignity" by The President's Council on Bioethics.
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