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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing with new preface and appendix
 
 
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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing with new preface and appendix (Paperback)

de Mancur Olson Jr. (Author)
4.3étoiles sur 5  Voir tous les commentaires (13 évaluations de client)
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There is now a considerable body of literature which attempts to apply economic analysis to political problems. In my opinion, Olson's is one of the most successful and provocative of these attempts Olson's central insight is novel and illuminating to political scientists and he shows that by the use of it he can give familiar facts (about labor unions, farm organizations, and other interest groups) new meaning. I believe that his work is going to force the jettisoning of much of what has been said about interest groups and the revision of the rest. It should also have an influence on the many political scientists who work in the field of organization.
--Edward C. Banfield, Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Urban Government, Member of the Faculty of Public Administration, Harvard University

Product Description

This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.

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1 internautes sur 1 ont trouvé ce commentaire utile :
5.0étoiles sur 5 The Power of the Individual in the Group!, Mai 31 2008
Par Ian Gordon Malcomson (Smithers, Canada) - Voir tous mes commentaires
(TOP 50 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   
According to Mancur Olson, one of the world's leading experts on the dynamics of collective action, social and economic groups generally form to promote collective goals in respect to personal interests. Ideally-sized groups work well only because its overall interests can be shown to mesh with those of the individual. On the other hand, large groups tend to function less cohesively because the individual does not have the same opportunity to realize personal gain or recoognition as in a small group. Small groups tend to be more able to involve the interests of the individual in defining the good of the whole, but, at the same time, less able because of financial restrictions to offer financial security to its members. As you can see, Olson has presented a number of trade-offs for his reader to consider when settling the issue of what degree of collective action best suits our economic needs. By the way, being a lone-wolf is not an option because according to Olson's theory, there is no social or economic benefit to be derived from standing alone. Somewhere, somehow we, as members of the human race, must attach ourselves to a group; it all comes down to how comfortable one is in relation to the size of the organization and personal benefit to be derived from it. When reading this book, I thought of Hillary Clinton's present position within the Democratic Party. Using some of Mancur Olson's observations, it might be said that egotistically, Hillary and Bill has grown too big for the party to handle. Though she wields consider influence within its ranks, many Democrats are starting to resent her influence as being inordinate. A collective action by a dominant subgroup called the Obama camp is clamoring for her to leave the field and surrender the nomination to their champion. According to Olson, such a dynamic of inner group dissatisfaction and turmoil often happens when its numbers become too large and its membership too active. As proof of that, which of the two main parties has been actively signing up new members to the fold? Of course the Democrats, and very new member enlisted becomes a potential delegate for either candidate. I would go one step further and suggest that collective action works as long as people work together in harmony or step aside and let a certain subgroup take over in the interests of the whole. If neither of these scenarios work, the group effort becomes fractured, which is where I think the Democrats might be heading before too long if they can't, at least, agree to disagree. For the Republicans, the story is slightly different. There is no evidence of unhappiness in the ranks but there is, in its place, a palpable lack of enthusiasm and optimism. I highly recommend this little book for what it says about the irrefutable logic of how groups of any size work in relation to the needs of the individual.
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4.0étoiles sur 5 Logically indeed, Avril 6 2004
Par Øystein Sjølie "Øystein Sjølie" (Oslo, Norway) - Voir tous mes commentaires
(REAL NAME)   
In this influential work, Mancur Olson is dismissing the 'classical' group theories, as he calls them. Rational individuals will rarely contribute to a common (or collective in the economics-lingo) good, because their contribution will be insignificant and the good will be produced whether the individual provides the good or not. With his stringent logic, the late Olson reminds his readers that groups of all kinds consist of individuals, and that these individuals usually follow there own interest, which not necessarily correspond with the organization's.

The book's explanatory powers are tremendous. Why large groups very rarely if ever are able to organize, and at the same time why some small groups exercise extraordinary amounts of power is Olsons main point of interest. In the very interesting last chapter he describes which features an organization, be it a farmer union, a labor union, a profession lobby or a special interest group, must inhibit to attain members.

The best trait of the book (at least for this reviewing economist) is the persuasive logic with which the arguments are hammered home, and the instructive examples that are used to illustrate the point just made. One little objection should be Olson's (human) tendency to arrogance when he is most pleased with his own conclusions. However: still an excellent read, 40 years after it's first printing.

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5.0étoiles sur 5 Old, but valuable, or at least very interesting, Mai 4 2003
Par Tatsuro Yoda (Culver City, CA United States) - Voir tous mes commentaires
This book is based on Olson's Ph.D. dissertation in 1963 at Economics Department of Harvard entitled 'A General Theory of Public Goods.' So, this is the book written 40 years ago, but I think still valuable, or at least very interesting.
You can learn what public good is and why it is not provided (or provided only by government). But textbooks do not explain what the difference is between small and large groups in terms of provision of public goods. This book explains it in a way that is understandable to people with minimal knowledge on economics.
If you are interested in questions like: Why do many people write a book review for Amazon.com without any monetary compensation?; Why do many people contribute to development of free software?; or Why DO your roommates clean a shared living room (= public goods)?; this book is worth your time and money.
Olson wrote an article entitled 'An Economic Theory of Alliances' with Richard Zeckhauser in 1966. If you would like to know only his theory and are not interested at all in how he applied it to many examples, I think this article is enough for your purpose.
Economist Todd Sandler wrote a book titled 'Collective Action: Theory and Applications' in 1992. Mancur Olson wrote a forward to this book, saying that the book is very well written on the same topic of 'Logic of Collective Action.' So if you are interested in recent development in this area, it would be time-efficient to read this Sandler's book.
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 		 Commentaires client les plus récents

5.0étoiles sur 5 GREAT LOGIC, CLEARLY WRITTEN ARGUMENT
Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action is one of the best arguments I have read on the theory of groups. Read more
Publié le Avril 8 2003 par Denis Benchimol Minev

5.0étoiles sur 5 Problem of Free Rider
Cost/Benefit When we look at cases of organizations like labor union, pressure group or firm, Even if members share the common interest, it doesn't guarantee they will act on that... Read more
Publié le Sep 22 2001 par Suckwoo Lee

5.0étoiles sur 5 The Few, The Proud, The Worthwhile
It continually amazes the curious mind how few books are written about important matters. It would seem groups are a fecund area for study, a kind of natural playground for better... Read more
Publié le Sep 6 2001 par James Versluys

4.0étoiles sur 5 A different point of view on the association-making theory
This is not the first Mancur Olson's book i have read (the other was an spanish translation of "The Rise and Fall .."). Read more
Publié le Déc 11 2000 par emanriqu

4.0étoiles sur 5 Good in theory, lacking proof
While this is an excellent book on group theory, it lacks sufficient empirical evidence supporting the conclusions the author comes to. Read more
Publié le Nov. 14 2000

5.0étoiles sur 5 THE crucial book on political economy
I once read that Olson was on the short list of people being considered for the Nobel Prize at the time of his death. Read more
Publié le Aoû 11 2000 par J. Michael Showalter

3.0étoiles sur 5 All large systems fail
Every system will expand to fill the univerese, corrupting all that it comes in contact with. that is the entire book. a few storys, ect. but that is it. THE WHOLE BOOK.
Publié le Mars 17 2000 par shunny boy

5.0étoiles sur 5 A Classic Book of Right-Wing Collective Behavior
Well, I'm a graduate school student in Taiwan. My major is labor studies. Olson provide a insightful thought about collective behavior. Read more
Publié le Sep 12 1999 par abberb

1.0étoiles sur 5 Olson needs to depart from ivory tower and visit real world
Probably one of the worst written books on economic theory that has been written.

Author hasn't visited corporate America to understand how groups small and large... Read more

Publié le Sep 3 1999

5.0étoiles sur 5 Insightful look at political stability and the economy
Olson uses economic rationality to explain the creation of stable social/political organizations. He offers a facinating glimpse at the full relationship between politics and... Read more
Publié le Jui 18 1999

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