Beyond Terror (Paperback)

10 years ago, while most of our country was getting in line for a golden age of globalization, fueled by technology and free trade, Ralph Peters, an Army Intelligence officer, was trying to find an audience for his theories on the deadly threat global terrorism would soon pose to the West.

Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World collects articles written by Peters both before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Peters' main argument is that the US has to do some serious catching up in order to do battle with its new enemies. The strategies and, more importantly, the mindset of the Cold War just won't do.

Of course, in hindsight, it's easy for us to read a book like this, proclaim Peters a seer, and accuse our military and government of wilfull ignorance and hubris. These accusations may very well be warranted, but it's important to remember that 10 years ago, Peters' voice was just one among many trying to predict the future.

However, since Peters did turn out to be right, Beyond Terror is worth reading, not for the "I told you so" moments (which are the most unfortunate parts of the book), but because, better than almost anyone else I've read, Peters is able to frame the war on terror in concrete, as opposed to ideological or philosophical, terms.

That it is a war on terror and not a "matter of law enforcement", Peters makes very clear, although, in general he maintains a non-partisan stance (he's as hard on Donald Rumsfeld as he is on former President Clinton). He provides a "How To" guide for fighting terror, builds a damning case against the way our intelligence services' bureaucratic, civil service framework undermines quality intelligence work, shines a light on the political causes for America's military defeats in the 1990s, and shows that from its beginnings America has been most effective militarily while fighting against empires. Part of the problem in America today, he argues, is that our traditional role of fighting empires conflicts with our current role of existing as a de facto post-modern empire.

However, the most interesting article isn't about strategy. It deals with the role information plays in a culture's ability to compete on a worldwide level. Societies that accept in the flood of information of our computer age and provide tools for their people to deal with it have become the most successful in the history of mankind. However, those countries with autocratic leaders who have tried to stop this flood from washing away their traditional, closed societies are fighting a losing battle.

Unfortunately, though the spread of information is inevitable, the damage has already been done. A vast majority of the people in the world simply do not have the skills to process the level of information we in the West are faced with every day. Already, this information shock has fueled the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, and Peters argues that things are likely to get worse unless the autocratic leaders in the world bring their countries fully into the information age. Of course, these leaders are unlikely to do this out of the goodness of their hearts: freedom of information is the first step in undermining autocracy.

The concept of information-friendly cultures vs. restricted information cultures is a much less inflammatory way of looking at the global conflict than some other models that have been offered over the last few years. People who are put off by "clash of civilization" arguments should find Peters' approach appealing.

Now, I don't agree with everything in this book. I believe Peters is far too hard on Cold Warriors, in general. Communism was a genuine threat to the world to which I'd have us overreact rather than underreact. But overall, Peters makes sond arguments based on his experience in military intelligence and his observations of the world we live in.

Well, not exactly. The degenerating culture in the Middle East that Peters so well delineates in the second essay in this collection has nothing to do with Christian apocalyptic delusions, nor have the horrors experienced by the people in sub Saharan Africa. And while there are nut cases in this country (as there have always been in Europe and the US) that believe in witches and warlocks and the Biblical anti-Christ, most of humanity is actually just trying to make a living.

Peters also loses it a bit when he writes "Men like to kill." He adds that some dislike it, but "the latter are few." Furthermore, "For many men, there is no more empowering act than taking a human life." (p. 83)

Again the generalization would be acceptable if indeed it applied to even a bare 51% of humanity. But it doesn't. The thugs and henchmen and Saddam Hussein-like warlords and bullies are greatly in the minority. Otherwise we could hardly cross the street. Peters shows that he realizes that he is overstating the case when he writes: "The crucial violence is usually perpetrated by a smallish number of actors...with a still larger group enjoying the spectacle of the violence and, perhaps looting." (pp. 86-87)

This is closer to the truth. Most people do not actually like to kill. We like to get others to do it for us. We don't even like to kill the cows and the pigs that we eat. We have specialists to do that for us.

It would be easy to dismiss Peters as a kind shock jock for those that can read or a postmodern son of Strangelove were it not for the fact that he is often right, and that he makes some critical points that cannot be ignored. He is especially effective in the opening essays in the book, "Our Place in History" which was written for this volume, and the above mentioned second essay, "When Devils Walk the Earth: The Mentality and Roots of Terrorism and How to Respond," which was written for a thinktank a month after September 11th, and could easily serve as guidance for President Bush. I suspect Bush has read this essay, although I don't expect him to admit it publically. Peters's Machiavellian advice would not play well in the media and is not the sort of reasoning that heads of state reveal to the public.

In the first essay (also perhaps given as advice to the Commander-in-Chief) Peters calls for an "enlightened" American empire, arguing that given the state of real politics in the world, mainly that we are the only superpower left, we have no choice but to accept the mantle and do our best.

I think there is more truth to this than most people, both here and especially in Europe, would like to admit. He makes the salient point that the American empire (already a partial reality) differs from that of Rome in that "our empire is cultural and economic, a matter of influence and the occasional exercise of military power, and not one of conquests and exploitation." (p. 19) I would add that our battalions take the form of multi-national corporations that serve to direct tribute and lucre to the US through economic power rather than by force of the sword.

In "When Devils..." Peters psychoanalyzes the Islamic Middle East coming up with an indictment that could be summed up with these words from page 46: "We [the vibrant, creative states of the West and the Pacific Rim] are succeeding, the Islamic world is failing, and they hate us for it." This is almost exactly the diagnosis presented (more gently) by Middle Eastern scholar Bernard Lewis in his books, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (2002) and The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Holy Terror (2003), and it is one that I think is substantially correct.

The central point of the essay however is to make a distinction between "practical terrorists" who just want to seize power, and "apocalyptic terrorists" who want to destroy our civilization and kill us all. Peters presents a 25-point "take no prisoners" program for dealing with such "monsters." His advice, simply put, is kill them before they kill us. By the way, his contention that apocalyptic Islamic terrorists are typically unable to form lasting, healthy relationships with the opposite sex (p. 33) and are the products of "sexual fears and humiliation as young adults" rings only too true. He recalls that September 11th hijacker Mohammed Atta demanded that "women not be allowed to pollute his grave by their presence." (p. 11)

Also good is the third essay in which Peters emphasizes the strength of free flowing information and how closed societies such as those in Islamic lands and North Korea are at a disadvantage economically and militarily because of their self-imposed ignorance. It is only in the fourth essay, "Heavy Peace," that Peters begins to reveal that in places he is patching over the cracks in his understanding with rhetoric.

I would also like to observe that his central message, that we must meet terror with terror, needs to be thoroughly examined lest we allow the end to justify the means and tumble down the slippery slope to the level of our terrorist enemies.