|
|
2.0étoiles sur 5
Disjointed, disorganized, missing the "middle focus", Avril 8 2002
In "The Battle of Okinawa", George Feifer demonstrates consummate skill with a microscope, somewhat less with a telescope, and no ability at all to see in the distances between. War's horrors for soldiers and civilians alike are portrayed again & again in the grunt's-eye or victim's-eye view of enduring physical and emotional misery riddled with unspeakable carnage and brutality. Description of the battle's place in the broad sweep of the Pacific War, in particular the decision to use atomic weapons on Japan, are less successful but still of value. But Feifer fails utterly to bring into focus anything larger than a firefight or smaller than a Pentagon. Crucial connections are left unmade, so that the reader comes away with very little feel for how the campaign was fought.Part of the problem is the lack of visual aids. One reviewer has already remarked the absence of photographs. Only one map is provided--of half the island--sketchy & erratically annotated. Combined with Feifer's herky-jerky narrative style--perhaps better described as a collection of shaggy-dog stories adrift in time and space--the reader gets little or no sense of what happened when, or (more importantly) what effects any one incident might have had on the ensuing. As one example, the discussion of kamikaze attacks against the naval forces, which continued from April 1 landing into late June, is concluded before any real treatment of the fighting in the south begins; and there is little effort to "crosswalk" the two. Feifer claims (in his introduction to the 2001 edition) that "this book doesn't pretend to be a military history...The Battle of Okinawa involved matters more important than its bloody heroism and anguish in the field and on the sea..." Yet there is precious little here BUT blood and anguish-at least until the penultimate chapter on how the battle affected the decision to use the A-bomb. Here is another problem: Feifer writes with a chip on his shoulder. His motto seems to be "war is hell" (or maybe, as one Marine puts it, "hell is war"), & he throws tale after tale of horror like grenades into the reader's lap in order to convince him. Maybe this is the fundamental reason for the confused & confusing narrative--nothing is to get in the way of the "moral". More disturbingly, Feifer's "damning with faint praise" treatment, while generally unbiased in the technical sense, leaves a perceptive reader feeling manipulated. Again and again, Feifer thunders with outrage regarding some facet of the battle that particularly offends him--and then very quietly, almost as an afterthought, admits facts that show his outrage is at best overblown, at worst intellectually dishonest. (He castigates war correspondents at length-- "Dispatches from Okinawa outdid themselves in masking rather than conveying the hardships.... Whatever few facts they supplied, their tone and assumptions fed the usual cheerleading prevarications." --then, two pages later, admits that "Reporters played on the same team as the fighters or didn't get to the game.... A maverick...wouldn't have lasted long." Well, golly. To paraphrase a famous quote of the time: Doesn't the author know there was a war on??) It's hard to fault Feifer's portrayal of the Okinawans as the real losers in the battle, with as many as a third of them killed. Surely a large number were victims of US bombardment that for all its fury left the deeply dug-in Japanese garrison largely intact. Maybe this is why he highlights supposed American moral failures while soft-pedaling those of the Japanese. With a 15-page chapter titled "American Atrocities", but no corresponding section for the defenders, he invites readers to conclude that the US was the prime villain. Reports of Japanese atrocities, including the casual murders of civilians as well as prisoners, are widely scattered & without emphasis, apparently to ensure that nothing mollifies righteous indignation at US actions. Or perhaps Feifer just dislikes the US government. From the alleged hauteur of Commodore Perry's original visit to the evils of the current US military presence chapter, the author has little good to say. (Though he finally, grudgingly admits that "if the bases must stay, many [Okinawans] quietly prefer them to remain in American hands than to be given over to the Japanese[!]") I wish Mr. Feifer had given a list of what he considers to be the best of the "more traditional [military histories of the battle, that] exist in English and Japanese" so that the interested reader (like myself, whose father was a motor-pool T-5 in the campaign) could complete the picture of which "The Battle Of Okinawa" gives part. Considering how narrow his interests, both historical and moral, in the conflict, I have to wonder if he even bothered to find them, let alone read them.
|