Arnhem 1944: Operation 'Market Garden' (Paperback)

Where the book fails is in the discussion of the multitude of errors that went into the planning and excution of the Operation. It was a campaign that was begun as much as a result of Montgomery's desire to be the one to win the war and not be bested by the Americans and Patton, as by military necessity. Once began, the British ignored the advise of the local resistance, utilized tactics that played into the strength of the Nazi resisters, and were too ambitious. This is not to mention the intelligence failures that convinced the Allies that they would be facing second rate worn out units.

All in all, Market Garden is a case study of what should not be done. Not only did it lead to the needless deaths, but it took vital resources away from the Patton's Third Army where they could have been put to better use and resulted in ending the war sooner.

Recommended for all who have a perepheral interest in the subject, as well as one who is already quite knowlegeble of it.

When a portion of the British Airborne marched towards Arnhem, they could have taken the ferry but did not (not in their orders)and went past the railroad bridge that was blown up. Had they had better "situational awareness" they could have taken and kept the ferry. But this book goes a step further---so what?

The point of penetrating into Arnhem was to get across the Rhine river and run wild in the German industrial regions and smash war machinery and deprive the enemy with the means to continue fighting. But to do a "Sherman march" like this, these areas had to be undefended. That opportunity simply was not there. The Germans had compressed their lines of supply/communication and were defending in depth. So if we had kept the bridge or the ferry across the Rhine, we would have only been stopped on the other side by the Germans. THAT----is what is not understood by most people especially after seeing the superb but not quite accurate film, "A Bridge too Far" by Cornelius Ryan. Those that label Operation Market-Garden as a "failure" fail themselves to realize that what it sought--a collapse of the enemy from the inside---was not possible against a nation on a desperate total war footing, so such negative labeling is unjustified.

I'm all in favor of Airborne units receiving light AFVs in order to effect off-set DZ insertions, if there was a "time machine" I'd go back and have Hamilcar gliders deliver Bren gun APCs and Locust M22/Tetrarch light tanks that existed at the time. I'd have some of Gavin's 82d Airborne drop directly onto the south of Arnhem bridge to support the British 1st Airborne driving across from the north in the Bren gun carriers/Locust/Tetrarch light tanks. I'd had Patton temporarily in charge of the 2-D dash up to Arnhem bridge. He'd have better, medium-sived tanks and aPCs that could swim themselves across and not need bridges in the first place. But at the end of the day, we'd be stopped on the far side of the bridge or the river bank by the Germans, a 50 mile penetration, definately worth doing, but a STRATEGIC AIM of driving unhindered into Germany to collapse their infrastructure was not possible at that time. This book explains this like no other work, and places it in a must-read category--if you don't read it you simply will not understand the battle and will be subject to the cliches' and labeling. When you understand this, you will remove your disappointment in the leaders at that time for not pursuing further. The truth is XXX Corps could have punched its way through to Arnhem bridge but the Commanders knew that there was no strategic vaccum behind it to exploit that would justify the human costs. A lot of hard fighting stood ahead of the Allies at this point.

Airborne!