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5.0étoiles sur 5
One of the Best of the Campaign Series, Mai 2 2002
Former Green Beret Gordon L. Rottman provides an excellent summary of America's last great amphibious invasion of the Second World War in Osprey's Campaign #96, Okinawa 1945. Quite simply, this is one of the better titles in Osprey's campaign series and shows that it is possible to pack a great deal about a major military operation into a 96-page format. This book is particularly useful as a case study for military officers, thanks to the author's attention to many pertinent details that escape most civilian authors. Overall, Okinawa 1945 is a "must-have" for anyone interested in the later stages of the Pacific War. Although Rottman follows the standard Osprey campaign format, the opening chapters of this volume are far more in-depth than virtually all the other titles in the series. An 11-page introduction covers the history and terrain of Okinawa, as well as the American strategic debate about whether to invade Okinawa or Formosa. The section on opposing plans is also quite detailed, totaling 10 pages. Seven pages are used to cover opposing high-level commanders on both sides. Another 12 pages are used to cover opposing forces, including succinct but detailed discussions of tactical organization and strength and weaknesses of each major unit. Pertinent characteristics are included; such as each US Army division in the invasion was about 1,000 infantrymen under strength due to a shortage of replacements and the fact that one of the two Japanese divisions on the island had no organic artillery. Taken together, Rottman provides a far more detailed introduction to the campaign than any other Osprey title, by spending fully 52% of the volume on the background material. Unfortunately, the strength of the introduction leads to the weakness of the main campaign narrative that - while good - is overly succinct. The invasion itself is covered in 33 pages: sections on the initial landings, the continuing offensive, actions at sea, and the push southward. There are three color battle scenes: Japanese suicide boats at Naha, Marines reducing a bunker and the virtual annihilation of the US 193rd Tank Battalion on 19 April 1945. There are a total of five 2-D maps (strategic situation, Okinawa, the initial landings, the Ie Shima assault, and the withdrawal of the 32nd Army)and three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (the Japanese counteroffensive on May 4-6, 1945, the Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, and the final stand in the south). The author also effectively uses footnotes at the end of each section to provide additional details. Okinawa 1945 has a great many strengths. The author's discussion of terrain and weather (e.g. the impact of rain on operations) greatly enhances the reader's appreciation for the operational environment. Rottman also makes very good use of statistics, particularly concerning military and civilian casualties. For example, I was unaware that 153 of 354 American tanks used on Okinawa were knocked out by the Japanese - a 43% loss rate for US armor. Nor was I aware that fully one-third of Okinawa's civilian population died in the campaign. The author also covers the challenges of civil-military operations (CMO); the US military had to screen and care for over 285,000 indigenous civilians on Okinawa. The introduction of some new weapons - such as the American 75mm recoilless rifles is discussed, as well as how both sides adapted their tactics based upon lessons learned from previous island battles. In particular, the Japanese adoption of defense-in-depth and attritional tactics allowed the Americans to get ashore at low cost, but provided the basis for a bloody, protracted campaign. Finally, the author provides a superb order of battle for both sides, including information on support units such as signal, engineer, medical, quartermaster, and MPs. Even the US Marine Corps' three canine platoons are included. The only real disadvantage of Okinawa 1945 - which is the overly short shrift given to the main battles on the Shuri Line - is not the author's fault, but rather due to Osprey's size limits. The last six weeks of the campaign are covered in about six pages, which leaves room for only a bare-bones account. No eyewitness accounts are incorporated into the campaign narrative, which could have been used to add intensity and grunt-level perspective. Otherwise, the campaign seems just like flags moving on a map, without real soldiers bleeding and dying. The maps are also a bit inadequate, particularly since no map depicts the initial battles or dispositions on the Machinato Line. The question of General Buckner's operational plans is also studiously avoided; over 7,600 Americans died on Okinawa and the question should have been raised if these losses were excessive. Due to the Japanese concentration of most of their forces in the south of the island, Buckner was able to land his troops and occupy the vital airfields and more than two-thirds of the island at the cost of fewer than 500 dead. The Americans came to Okinawa to get the airfields and they succeeded in seizing them at very low cost. Was it really necessary to engage the remaining Japanese garrison - hopelessly trapped in one corner of the island - in a bloody attritional battle for over 80 days? With so many Japanese garrisons bypassed across the Pacific, it seems odd that Buckner never considered sealing the Japanese 32nd Division off and slowly reducing them to impotence by bombardment and starvation. Particularly given the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew of the impending Atomic Bomb raids, it seems odd that so many American leaders would endorse an attritional battle like Okinawa at this stage of the war.
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