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4.0 out of 5 stars
For Specialists Only!, Mar 27 2004
Harry Gailey is somewhat well-known among historians of the Second World War in the Pacific. He's probably best-known as the historian who's most critical of senior Marine officers during the war in the Pacific, most notably during the Battle of Saipan. His book on that battle, "Howlin' Mad Vs. the Army", is the ultimate indictment of Holland Smith and his removal of of General Ralph Smith during the battle on that island. The current book considers the battle for Peleliu, one of the most senseless and pointless battles of the Pacific or any other war. Launched to protect a supply line that didn't exist from planes that had already been destroyed, the invasion was supposed to go off without a hitch and take only a few days. As is usual with that sort of prediction (you'd think people would learn) the battle took six weeks rather than the predicted four days.The battle was directed mostly by the commanding general of the first Marine division at the battle, William Rupertus. General Rupertus comes in for most of the criticism that Gailey directs at the conception of this invasion. Rupertus was assisted by Oliver P. Smith (later commander of the division during the Korean War) and the division's regiments were led by, among others, the legendary Lewis "Chesty" Puller. The invasion was planned rather simply, with the three Marine regiments landing abreast on the southwest coast of the island, one battalion of the rightmost regiment held in reserve. There were two regiments of an army division in transit that could have been used as a reserve, but Rupertus, like many Marine generals, was very disdainful of the army, and decided that they would be no help. As a result, the division was shot to pieces during the battle, suffering 1300 killed and another 6700 wounded. The army finished up the fighting in the hills on the western coast of the island, where the battle raged on into 1945 on a small scale. The book is not as long as some other books, and it's definitely not the usual oral history sort of thing that's popular these days. Instead, it's more of an analysis of the combat that happened on the island, the maneuvers that occurred, and the results. As much as possible, there's discussion of what was going on in the Japanese command post also, though there the motives are somewhat murky because all the high-level participants on the island were killed in the fighting, or committed suicide. This is a short, dispassionate look at the battle, the personalities, and the issues involved in the island battle. I enjoyed it, but those who like the human interest stuff may find it somewhat lacking. It is, however, a good analysis of the battle and the campaign.
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