The Boer War 1899-1902 (Paperback)

After a short introduction and chronology, The Boer War 1899-1902 provides an excellent 10-page section on the background to the war. Interestingly, the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the 19th Century and its relationship to the crisis that led to war might seem analogous with the modern relationship between oil and international security. The six-page section on opposing sides is also quite good; in particular, the author notes the Boer's advantage in tactical mobility due to all their troops being mounted, and the possession of a small, but efficient artillery arm. In the section on the outbreak of the war, the author notes how both sides were inclined to seek war as a solution and how the Boers imported large quantities of weapons and ammunition just before the conflict began. The actual campaign narrative is 35 pages in length and is supported by ten maps (South Africa 1899, principal theater of operations, the siege of Ladysmith, the Battle of Colenso, the Battle of Spion Kop, the siege of Mafeking, Lord Robert's advance, the siege of Kimberley, the blockhouse system, and Smut's invasion of the Cape Colony). The section on "portrait of a soldier" profiles Deneys Reitz, a Boer commando who wrote a postwar memoir, while "portrait of a civilian" profiles Emily Hobhouse, an Englishwoman who attempted to improve the welfare of interned Boer civilians. Final sections cover how the war ended and its consequences. The bibliography is also quite good and more extensive than most other Osprey volumes, and the illustrations throughout are also excellent.

The series of military defeats that the British forces suffered in the first three months of the conflict are amazing by any standard; expert Boer rifle marksmanship, efficient artillery, knowledge of the terrain and cunning selection of defensive positions allowed the farmers-turned-soldiers to annihilate one British battalion after another. Most of the rest of the British army was cut-off and besieged in isolated posts like Ladysmith, Kimberly and Mafeking. Indeed, had the Boer's used their initial advantages to push on and seize the vital coastal ports, the British might not have been in a position to relieve their besieged garrisons for some time and the war might have been ended much sooner. As Fremont-Barnes narrative reveals, the Boers were very successful throughout the war on the tactical level, but on the operational level they were overly conservative and unimaginative. On the other hand, it seems almost incredible that so many British commanders could persist in frontal assaults against entrenched Boer positions, even after ample evidence that this was disastrous. The British had important deficiencies in tactical mobility and intelligence that left them unable to come to grip with their foes in the initial stages of the war. The British also had a tendency to split up their forces too much, based upon their innate (but false) sense of tactical superiority. Time and again, small British columns were surprised and overwhelmed. In the end, the British were able to win the conventional phase of the war by using overwhelming and concentrated force, as well as rectifying their mobility problems by widespread use of cavalry. The guerrilla phase was won by the controversial policies of "scorched earth," internment camps and blockhouses to contain the free-riding Boer commandos.

Fremont-Barnes' narrative is full of interesting insights that are applicable to other conflicts, in other times. One British officer notes that the seizure of the Boer capitals seems to have had little impact on their will to resist: "the Boers set no store by them [the capitals] apparently; neither Bloemfontein nor Pretoria have been seriously defended, and they go on fighting after their loss just as if nothing had happened." Barnes also notes that the British army found it relatively easy to control the few towns and even the rail lines, but found it almost impossible to control the vast stretches of open veldt upon which the Boer commando roamed (although in a few years, the arrival of aircraft would have made life tougher for the Boers) - which is still a problem familiar to modern military personnel in places like Somalia, Afghanistan and the Balkans.

Ultimately, the British achieved a military victory after committing 450,000 troops to subdue an enemy that never had more than 60,000 troops. Nor was victory cheap; the war cost Britain £200 million and 22,000 dead. Oddly, the victory was a hollow one. Fremont-Barnes notes that, "the greatest paradox of the war was the fact that, though Britain emerged the victor in the military sense, the Boers clearly won the peace. Within a decade of the end of hostilities all four South African Crown colonies had been unified into a self-governing union dominated by Afrikaners. The Boer republics had gone to war in the name of liberty and now they had achieved it."