Noted Military Historian Bevin Alexander's latest effort represents an expansion of BH Liddell Hart's work. In his classic text on strategy, Liddell Hart differentiates between direct and indirect methods of warfare, and finds the latter to be by far the more successful approach. Liddell Hart does not examine different types of indirect action, however, and this is where Alexander's work comes in. Alexander begins with the premise that frontal assaults against fortified positions should never be attempted. Attacks should always come from the side or rear. This has the advantage of striking the enemy where they are weaker, and perhaps more importantly, it throws them off psychologically, disorienting, and frightening them. Alexander lists thirteen such variations on these same ideas, such as encirclement, holding in one place and striking another, creating diversions, cutting of the enemy's retreat, etc. Each method receives its own chapter, accompanied by several historical examples of the successful execution of the tactic, usually taken from as many different eras as possible. Of particular note are the examples taken from Stonewall Jackson's campaigns, a subject on which Alexander is one of the leading authorities. In writing this work it seems clear that Alexander is trying to place himself in line with the classics of military theory: Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart. Only time will tell whether or not he achieves this lofty goal. In the meantime there is little doubt that this fascinating and well-written work should be closely examined military strategists, historians, and armchair generals.

Although this book has some obvious and well-documented flaws, it is the first system created that allows for a fair assessment of pitchers from all time periods. That alone is a very important contribution, and one that has generally been overlooked so far. Thomas idea for the book is simple: Create a baseline from one five-year time period (1996-2000) from which to compare all players based on the performance levels in those years. There are of course some flaws with the idea, as well as with Thomas' own execution of it. Certainly the game changes for one, and its hard to act as if doesn't. For example, the innings thrown for the pitchers from the dead-ball era are simply too high: Pitchers could throw many innings then since hitting was much harder. Estimating how many equivalent innings that would be in today's game is both impossible and irrelevent. The computerized playoffs Thomas sets up are also a bit fruitless. Why should we believe his simulations more than what actually happened? The statistics for hitters, however, are more useful. It gives a good idea of what a player who hit in a power-poor era would produce today. It also makes one appreciate the hitting prowess of the great sluggers like Williams, Ruth, and Mantle. The major flaw is that this system cannot take into account a hitter's protection in the lineup, so a player hitting on a good team, like Lou Gehrig, will look better than he actually was. I believe that for hitters, the Bill James win shares system is superior, but this system should not be so easily dismissed.

The great contribution of this system, however, is in its ability to allow for a fair comparison of pitchers. The Win Shares system comes up short on this standard, since it seeks an absolute number of win shares won. This would obviously favor players from the dead ball era when pitchers could throw many more games. And nearly all the top players in the Win Shares system are from the dead ball era, while modern stars like Roger Clemens and Greg Maddux languish out of the top ten. Leveling the Field is superior in this regard since it does not seek absolute numbers, but relative ones: What would a player's ERA be in a controlled environment? And when we look at it in these terms we find that modern players match up just fine with the old timers: Thomas' lists of greatest pitchers are fairly even matched throughout baseball history, with pitchers from all eras represented. Furthermore, it also clears up a current debate that has been simmering for several years: Who is the greatest pitcher of this generation, Clemens or Maddux? It turns out that Maddux is the better pitcher, and it isn't even that close. Maddux career ERA is 3.05 while Clemens is 3.38. Furthermore, Maddux top seasons were all better that Clemens. In fact, they were even better than Pedro Martinez. It turns out that Maddux best seasons are the best ever, topping even Walter Johnson himself. There are plenty of other interesting things to be found here, like the fact that Randy Johnson has posted better numbers than Sandy Koufax and that Bob Gibson really did not have the greatest pitching season ever in 1968. This book has some very important uses, but baseball fans haven't picked up on it yet. It may be time to take another look.

This collection of essays seeks to explain why, despite its overwhelming power, the world has not balanced against the United States. Several well-noted authors give varying answers. The first essay, appropriately enough, is written by the founder of Structural Realism, Kenneth Waltz. Waltz answer is simply that the world will eventually balance against American power, and in fact has started to do so already. Waltz explains that in an anarchic system,"overwhelming power repels, and leads others to balance against it." Furthermore, Waltz sees Unipolarity as unstable, as the hegemon may be tempted to overexpand. Waltz concludes that the unipolar moment is exactly that, a brief time in history that will be over the blink of an eye. But Waltz made much the same case in 1993. The world has not yet balanced against the US, and history has yet to prove him right. Taking the opposite approach, William C. Wohlforth argues that the current unipolar system is actually very stable. This is so due to several factors. First, Wohlforth notes that balancing is very difficult to successfully execute. Also, unlike previous hegemons, America's power is so great that it crosses the threshold where balancing against it becomes impossible. Also unlike previous hegemons, the US is not located geographically nearby the other powers. Therefore, it does not directly threaten most states as much as their neighbors do. It is therefore better for states to rely on the US for protection from its own neighbors, than to balance against America. Wohlforth thus sees a continuation of the peaceful relations that have existed since the end of the Cold War. These two essays are most likely the ones that will receive the most attention since they predict future events based on structure. But somewhat dissapointingly, neither addresses the argument made by John Mearsheimer in his book that other states will not necessarily balance against the United States itself, but against the United States in their respective regions. Mearsheimer, unlike Wohlforth, does not see the system as global but regional. Therefore China will balance against US power in the Far East, not against global US power and interests. Mearsheimers's argument fall somewhere between Waltz and Wohlforth. Its a shame neither one addresses it.

The other articles in this book are more policy-oriented. Charles Kupchan claims that it will be very hard to sustain domestic support in America for the resources necessary to maintain unipolarity. He also believes the EU to be much farther along the road to unity than most realize, and he sees a balance of power between the US and EU in the future. Stephen Walt, advancing his balance of threat hypothesis, urges American policymakers to act and speak in a restrained manner, which will convince the world that the US does not have aggressive designs. Josef Joffe praises the US policy of overlapping alliances as a copy of Bismark's hub and spoke system, which he believes will serve to create a peaceful world, due to America's overwhelming capabilities. There are also some non-realist authors who make the case for other variables. John Ikenberry advances the importance of international institutions in creating a peaceful world, arguing that the "Western order has a structure of institutions and open polities that bind states together, thereby mitigating the implications of power assymetries and reducing the possibilities of the United States to abandon or dominate other states." Ikenberry argues that insitutions have a life of their own and make it difficult for states to do other than what the institutions specify. Its not a new theory, and realist critiques will most likely be the same: Instiutions do what states want them to do, not vice-versa. Although there are no realist critiques of the Ikenberry piece in this volume, it is hard to imagine any realist worth his weight in salt arguing otherwise.

Over two thousand years ago, the Ancient World was thrust into three major conflicts that not only changed the course of antiquity, but the course of the world as we know it today. The three wars fought between Rome and Carthage between 264 and 146 BC gave rise to the Roman Empire, and Rome's subsequent influence on World History. Despite its importance, however, the Punic Wars are not well-known to those outside the insular world of the Classics. Adrian Goldsworthy has provided a great service by making these world wars of antiquity accesible to the modern reader and the general public. Doing so is no easy task, considering the incomplete record that one has to cope with whenever writing about the ancient world. Goldsworthy manages to put together his history based partially on the primary works of the ancient writers Polybius, Livy, and Appian (while noting each one's shortcomings) and partially on the more recent excavations of the battle sites. The result is a fluid narrative, albeit one that a reader used to accounts of more recent history might find frustrating, since a good deal of information is still uncertain.

Of the three Punic Wars, the Second (Hannibalic) is covered in the greatest detail. While nearly everyone knows that Hannibal crossed the Alps with his elephants, few know how he managed to do so. And the losses that his armies suffered en route are even less well-known. Once it Italy, Hannibal won victory after victory, culminating in the massacre at Cannae in 216, still regarded as the most one-sided battle ever. Despite this, the Romans fought on, with a stubborness and determinedness that eventually won them all three wars. How they did so remains one of the most fascinating and instructive historical tales of all time. The implications of the wars of antiquity are many. For a historian, the importance of these wars in shaping the ancient and modern worlds should be examined. For the military strategist, it is worth comparing the strategies of ancient generals to glean information of the conduct and theory of war. And the political scientist, forever complaining about the lack of "qualitative" data (eg, historical examples), should began incorporating the wars of the ancient world, as well as those of the modern, into their theories of state behavior.

Recent historiography on the Arab-Israeli Conflict has focused almost exclusively on the 1948 War. The 1967 War, which rivals the War of Independence in terms of importance in shaping the region, has been overlooked. Michael Oren has written the first comprehensive account of this monumental event, based on the archives on the principal actors involved. Oren devotes about half on the book to the origins of the war, since they were both complex and highly unusual: Most wars are disputes between states over territory, influence, power, allies, etc. The Six Day was about power and influence, but not between the combatants. Rather, it was a result of Nasser's desire to increase his power in both his own country and the Arab world. As such, it was a war that didn't need to happen, and one with disastrous result for the region.

Following a false Soviet report that Israel was moving against Syria, Nasser started increasing anti-Israel rhetoric and action. His goal at first was merely to improve his own position at home and abroad by being seen as taking on the Zionist invader. But he unwittingly unleashed a chain of events that eventually swept him up by their momementum. As pro-war crowds rallied in Cairo, Nasser moved his troops into the Sinai, and then demanded that the UN observers stationed there leave, which they did. This, coupled with the closing of the Straits of Tiran, which Israel considered a Causus Belli, probably made the war inevitable. Nasser then began to believe his own rhetoric, and drew plans for an invasion.

Meanwhile, the situation elsewhere grew worse for Israel. The Arab world rallied behind Nasser, and the other states, including Jordan agreed to back Egypt. The driving force behind all this was visceral Arab hatred of Israel; Oren makes this intense dislike of the Jewish state palpable, and can feel the strength of this emotion's permeation througout the Arab world. Israel tried to gain French and Western support, but was unable to do so. In Tel-Aviv, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and his cabinet weighed their options, and agonized over what to do. When they finally decided to go to war, it was almost too late: Nasser had cancelled an order to attack the day before.

The war began on June 5th with an aerial assault on Egyptian targets that achieved all of its objectives. Israel then launched a ground offensive, which immediately drove back the Egyptians. The confused and poorly led Egyptian army never put up a real fight. In five days they were driven across the Suez Canal with huge losses. On the second day, Jordan began to shell Israeli positions in Jerusalem. Israel began with a limited response, but the fighting increased, and Israel decided to take the Old City as a military necessity. It was also militarily necessary to take the West Bank to secure Jerusalem from Jordanian columns, but Eshkol immediately realized the problems that would come with occupying a hostile population. Syria did little more than shell Israel from behind their lines on the Golan Heights during the first days of the war. But Israel had put up with constant Syrian shelling before the war, and Rabin pushed for an attack to secure Israeli farms in the North. Syrian troops didnt even engage, and Israel took the Golan.

Oren' narrative is beliveable because he cites internal souces from the various sides (except Syria). This account will not be accepted by pro-Arab sources, or even revisionist historians, since Oren does not explain the Arab grievances against Israel, and does not conclude that Israel did not have to start the war, or that Israel wanted Jerusalem and the West Bank for expansionist, ideological reasons. But he supports his assertions, and until someone else writes a history based on primary sources, this will be the definitive account of the June 1967 Watershed.

Retired Air Force Colonel Walter Boyne's book on the 1973 October War reveals much new information. Perhaps the most important of these is the fact that the world came to the brink of nuclear war, not once, but twice during the conflict. Boyne begins by exploring how Israel was ill-prepared for the well-planned and well-executed Arab surprise attack on October 6, 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish year. Following the stunning initial gains by the Egyptians in the Sinai, and the Syrians in the Golan, Israeli political leaders began to discuss what was known as the "Sampson Option." That is, if Israel were going to be destroyed, it was going to take down its enemies with it. Israel had no way of knowing that it was not the Arab goal to destroy the state. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's aim was simply to capture territory on the east bank of the Suez Canal, an objective he achieved in three days. Meanwhile, the Syrians had also made impressive gains, but failed to press their advantage, for reasons that are unclear. This, coupled with the Egyptian army's halt in the Sinai allowed Israel to regroup and press the offensive in the North. Egypt foolishly decided to press to the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai, and its armor was torn to shreds in the largest tank battles since World War Two. The war may have shifted to Israel's advantage, but supplies were running critically low, with only a few days' worth of ammunition left. The US, led by Henry Kissinger, decided to airlift supplies into Israel, allowing Israel to continue its offensive operations, crossing the Suez Canal, and choking off the Egyptian forces, while pushing back the Syrians, along with their Iraqi and Jordanian allies. Yet the massive airlift barely was able to begin, since no European country would allow the US an airbase to transfer its supplies, fearing the wrath of the Arab oil weapon. Finally, Portugal, in need of arms for its own wars, allowed the US a base in the Atlantic. The airlift was on, and it landed a huge number of supplies in a round-the-clock effort. With Israel advancing, the Soviets proposed inserting a unilateral Soviet force in the region, leading the US to place its armed forces on high alert, known as Def Con 3. The panicked Soviets quickly backed down from their demands, but nuclear tensions reached their highest point in years. Boyne's own Air Force background shines in his explanation of all events related to the air war and the airlift; he also has an impressive understanding of events in the diplomatic arena. Overall, this an excellent book, well-written, impeccably researched, and a gripping read.

Retired Air Force Colonel Walter Boyne's book on the 1973 War reveals much new information. Perhaps the most important of which is the fact that the world came to the brink of nuclear war not once but twice during the conflict. Boyne begins by exploring how Israel was ill-prepared for the well-planned and well-executed Arab surprise attack on October 6, 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish year. Following the stunning initial gains by the Egyptians in the Sinai, and the Syrians in the Golan, Israeli political leaders began to discuss what was known as the "Sampson Option." That is, if Israel was going to be destroyed, it was going to take down its enemies with it. Israel had no way of knowing that it was not the Arab goal to destroy the state. Sadat's aim was simply to capture territory on the east bank of the Suez Canal, an objective he achieved in three days. Meanwhile, the Syrians had also made impressive gains, but failed to press their advantage, for reasons that are unclear. This, coupled with the Egyptian army's halt in the Sinai allowed Israel to regroup and press the offensive in the North. Egypt foolishly decided to press to the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai, and its armor was torn to shreds in the largest tank battles since World War Two. The war may have shifted to Israel's advantage, but supplies were running critically low, with only a few days ammunition left. The US, led by Henry Kissinger, decided to airlift supplies into Israel, allowing Israel to continue its offensive operations, crossing the Suez Canal, and choking off the Egyptian forces, while pushing back the Syrians, along with their Iraqi and Jordanian allies. Yet the massive airlift barely was able to begin, since no European country would allow the US an airbase to transfer its supplies, fearing the wrath of the Arab oil weapon. Finally, Portugal, in need of arms for its own wars, allowed the US a base in the Atlantic. The airlift was on, and it landed a huge number of supplies in a round the clock effort. With Israel advancing, the Soviets advocated inserting a unilateral force in the region, leading the US to place its armed forces on high alert, known as Def Con 3. The panicked Soviets quickly backed down from their demands, but nuclear tensions reached their highest point in years. Boyne's own Air Force background shines in his explanation of all events related to the air war and the airlift; He also has an impressive understanding of events in the diplomatic arena. Overall, this an excellent book, well-written impeccably researched, and a gripping read.

Rating the Presidents is both a fun and important exercise. Many scholars undertake such an endeavor, and the results posted here are both reasonable and well-supported. The essays on each President tend to be more biographical than evaluative, however. But they are useful in gaining a knowledge of past executives who one may not know much about. The book is also a fairly easy read, and rates each President of the basis of several factors, including Leadership qualities, accomplishments and crisis management, political skill, appointments, and character and integrity. For the most part the rankings seem right on: Few would dispute ranking Lincoln, FDR, and Washington at the top, and Harding, Buchanan, Grant, and Pierce near the bottom. That said, what tends to stand out most in a survey like this are the errors. I believe that Jefferson rates too high (no. 4), perhaps as a result of the great things he did not as president, and perhaps because people tend to underestimate just how big a mistake the Embargo Act was. But by far the biggest problem with the book are the most recent ratings, maybe because the debates are too fresh. Rating Jimmy Carter as the 19th most effective President (out of 41!) is sheer lunacy. Carter gets high ratings in the character department, but he was also dogmatic and inflexible. Another study rated him as the tenth worst president ever. And as many have noted, the low ranking of Reagan is really problematic. Destroying the Soviet Union alone should secure him a very high place, but for some reason he is not credited for this. And Reagan was actually a man of high integrity, despite the scandals within his administration. Finally, Clinton gets rated near the middle, but since this book was written, the Monica Lewinsky scandal erupted, along with the Marc Rich pardon. Furthermore, the economy went into recession as soon as he left office, and the peace process in the Middle East, which he so wanted to leave as his legacy, collapsed into violence. And of course, Clinton bears at least some degree of responsiblity for the unprepared state of affairs that led to 9-11. Perhaps the next edition will cover this ground as well.

In this lengthy and comprehensive yet highly readable volume, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher lays out her vision for global policies for the new century. Since her book is about the future, Lady Thatcher takes us on a tour of the globe, describing the various regions of the world, and their issues: We should try and incorporate China into the global community, but keep firm limits on them as well. Japan will reform its economy when they are ready, not when we want them to. We should continue to take a hard-line against rogue states, like Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Thatcher also warns against a Euro superstate, and urges Britain to distance themselves from the continent. She also makes a strong call for the United States to build a missile shield, while keeping the military strong, both monetarily and morally. This includes resisting calls for placing women in combat. In one of the more memorable passages in the book, Thatcher declares that "we women are better at wielding the handbag than the bayounet." But this book is also about the past. Thatcher declares that the West smashed Communism, and is proud of her role in aiding the U.S. and particularly Ronald Reagan (to whom the book is dedicated) in that effort. But above all, this book is about ideology, particularly Thatcher's unabashed and unashamed conservatism. Conservatives value freedom, while Liberals value equality. But according to Thatcher, individuals differs in talents and ability, leading to unequal outcomes. All attempts to limit unequal outcomes necessarily involve limiting freedom, and in doing so, stifles creativity and economic gain. Capitalism itself is neither good nor bad; It is how we go about pursuing it that determines its morality. Conservatives also value nationalism as an important asset despite its flaws, and Thatcher calls herself a proud patriot, and resists all attempts to undermine state sovereignty, including the detention of General Pinochet in Britain. In sum, Lady Thatcher has written a towering work, one with implications for the future, with insights on the past, and with philosophy at its root. Anyone interested in world affairs should read this book. Even those who disagree with her prescriptions cannot deny that she lays ourt her argument cogently and effectively.

Historians and Political Scientists tend to focus on what leaders' have accomplished, weighing them as effective or not, rather than examining how they achieved them, or even how they came to office in the first place. This overlooked aspect of history is known as political strategy, and Dick Morris has taken a huge step in filling that void with his stunning new book "Power Plays." Morris cites six different types of strategies that political leaders can use. But the use of these strategies alone are not a prescription for success or failure. It is how leaders' execute these strategies that determines whether or not they will prevail. For example, both Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater pursued the same policy goals using the same basic strategy, what Morris calls Standing On Principle. But whereas Goldwater was combative and negative, Reagan was joyful and positive. Goldwater ran against the liberal establishment, while Reagan ran against the Soviet Empire. Morris continues to examine the successes and failures of the six strategies through well-written historical examples, and his juxtaposition of the two outcomes from the same strategy makes the book convincing. Along the way, Morris treats us to other previously unknown illuminations of history. Wilson could have the vote for the League of Nations had he campaigned on idealistic and nationalistic principles rather that legalistic ones. Gore would have won in 2000 had he stayed aligned with his traditional environmentalism. Rockefeller strayed too far to the left to be elected but GW Bush managed the feat by not isolating his base of support. We are also introduced to how leaders should act in times of crisis, as exemplified by Roosevelt and Churchill durin the Second World War. How not to act in a crisis was exemplified by Johnson during Vietnam, which cost him his Presidency. Morris' book is therefore a real achievement, which incorporates historical examples into a well-defined theoretical framework, making this a genuine piece of political science that will not only stand the test of time, but may well influence more scholars to study campaign strategy in addition to more traditional historical pursuits.