Customer Reviews

The End of Detroit: How the Big Three Lost Their Grip on the American Car Market

5 star:		(12)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(4)
1 star:		(9)

 

 

An interesting book without doubt. The author seems to have some grudge against the big three in Detroit. True the big three has had its share of problems and most were self-imposed. As it is now 8 years old some of the predictions she wrote about have not materialized. I think that the big three can now compete with the import market quite readily. Many of her facts are true but some are a bit distorted. Its interesting how she makes little of the Japanese recalls yet goes way overboard when the American cars have problems. This book was written before the massive Toyota recall. Nonetheless the history, albeit in bits and pieces, she writes about is interesting. There is a definite lean towards imports. Anyone considering buying an import instead of a domestic might want to read a newer book. I do know that the big three do not make a vehicle I'd want but then again neither do the Japanese. The Koreans are taking over the import market.

I must say, I'm not as good a writer as Ms. Maynard, but I think I actually may know more about the car business than she. In fact, if you're an enthusiast, you may very well know more than she does as well. The book is just fair. It gives some neat historical recounts on how the Japanese set up their operations in the US, and how their corporate cultures and history are in Japan. I must say, though, there were times when I just wanted to give up on this book. Why? Errors...this thing is full of factual errors. For example, she says that Nissan owns a large piece of Fuji Heavy Industries, the maker of Isuzu. This is not correct. Nissan does own a large piece of FHI (they were the largest shareholder before GM bought 50% of the company), but FHI makes Subaru, not Isuzu. They have ties to Isuzu, but the reason why Nissan owning FHI was an issue is because of the Subaru competition (Imprezza and Legacy go head to head with the Sentra and Altima). This specific point is discussed in the fabulous book "Turn Around" about Carlos Ghosn. There are other errors as well. Her recounting of timing is also often off in talking about when a certain vehicle was the top seller (Camry, Accord and Taurus discussion), and when each luxury marque was the top in the US.

Another knitpicky thing is that she uses the word "dwarfs" a lot. However, she flips it's meaning. Dwarfs means that something that dwarfs something else looks much smaller next to it (i.e. A dwarfs B, and A is smaller than B). Sometimes she uses it in this correct way, and other times she uses it to mean the thing that dwarfs the other thing is bigger (i.e. A dwarfs B, and A is bigger than B). As a writer, she should know what she's saying, but should certainly at the very least be consistent.

I would let the dwarfs thing go, but the automotive errors are not forgivable, and they smack you in every chapter. If she is wrong about so much in the auto industry, it's hard to accept her take in the book. I don't disagree with her notion, but, really, get some fact checkers, or get educated about your topic.

I found this book to be very readable and very interesting. In my opinion, the author offers an unbiased review of the Big Three and the UAW. I sympathize with the unions (I'm in one) but a different approach will be necessary to make the Big Three competitive with Detroit South. I can relate to her statements concerning the Big Three cars to the imports. I've found my European and Asian car far more ergonomically sound and reliable than my Ford Explorer. Sometime the truth hurts....

The End of Detroit is a outstanding and well-researched book about the automotive industry in Detroit. From the explanations about the fall of the domestic market to the rapid gain of the foreign market, the book always has an answer to the many problems the industry faced over the years. The book is a quick read, but can be bias in spots in favor of the foreign market and the takeovers they have made over the years. The first half of the book is like a history lesson and at times spends too much time focusing on one topic and forgetting the rest of the automotive world. The middle and near end of the book, talks more about companies like Honda, Toyota, and BMW and their stronger gains in the industry. These companies in the end caused the squeeze out of the big three and forced many changes to occurre. The final portion of the book gives a brief depiction of what the author thinks will happen in the end. She touches very little on the issues at hand today like, gas, car size, and environments issues and spends more time on the foreign markets future.

Witch car is better? After reading this book, you also will have a confused and more difficult time making that decision.

I was very excited about receiving this book as a gift and eagerly dug into reading it. Unfortunately, I am quite disappointed with most elements of the book and think that Ms. Maynard missed a great opportunity to dig deep into the downfall of an American-led industry.

The book is written from a journalistic viewpoint rather than from a business strategist/analyst viewpoint. The proof of Japan's successes or Detroit's failures was recalled via anecdotes instead of concrete sales results and trends. The anecdotes provide nice human interest stories, but provide little business proof for success or failure. She does interject a little profit margin data over time, but doesn't acknowledge that profit margins in all industries decrease as the industry matures.

Additionally, at different points in the book, Ms. Maynard contradicts her previous conclusions. For example, early in the book, she emphasizes that Japan's success is getting cusotmers to return and buy another Japanese nameplate; however, later she chastizes Detroit for the same thing, indicating that they are not focused on capturing additional marketshare (which is hard to do when you have greater than 50%).

The book does provide a nice history review for those that are interested, but feels like a TQM book from 15 years ago.

I felt like I was reading a first year business school case with big business words, but small business ideas. The chapters meander and rehash well known stories (the introduction of Saturn).

Others have already noted the various factual errors and sweeping generalizations. The thing that really irked me about this book is that its title leads you to believe that most of the reading will be about the US car industry....in fact, you read chapter after chapter about imports, with references to how Detroit compares to the imports.

One whole chapter on Camry, one whole chapter on Hyundai/BMW, one whole chapter on the ENTIRE history of Toyota & Honda, etc. gets pretty boring, as I really could do without a complete history lesson of the major import manufacturers. The book should have focused on what has been going on at the Big Three (decisions made, models produced, sales info, market trends, quality/reliability) and how consumer preferences have led to the imports' increased market share in the US......

There was just too much emphasis on specific imports with too little relevant content as pertains to the title of the book.

I wasn't expected to much from this book but it was very balanced in what it had to say.It's all based on sound facts and figures the author has taken from the recent past as well as the not so recent 50's,60's,70's and 80's. The hardcore made-in-USA crowd may not want to read it or they'll refuse to acknowledge it,but it's very difficult not to come to the conclusion that the author hints at. The big three have talked the talk for too long while their products don't walk the walk.Serious car buyers are in many cases shunning Detroit products and it's getting worse, not better.

This is an excellent and well-researched book. The author described how in the past three decades Detroit has routinely lost major market niches and market shares to foreign brands due to inept management. In the seventies, Detroit lost out the compact fuel-efficient market to the foreigners. In the eighties, foreigners gained market shares in sedans. In the 1990s, foreigners gained in the minivans, SUV, and luxury car markets. In other words, Detroit has nowhere to go. Managerial mediocrity and technological backwardness has caught up with Detroit. Economies of scales are not enough to fend off foreigners far superior manufacturing capabilities. Foreigners are more efficient producers of much higher quality car, with better styling, at a lower cost. This is particularly true of the Japanese.

Detroit's main competitive strategy is through various forms of price discounting, including 0% financing, rebates, and pushing high volume of cars at wholesale prices through rental companies. The author states such a strategy is a disaster. This is because it hurts the resale value of cars; and therefore alienates once-loyal customers. Customers are then lost to superior foreign car manufacturers. And, once lost, these customers never switch back. Do you know anybody who owned a Chrysler as a student, who switched to a Honda as a young professional, and then switched back to an American car? I don't think so.

Foreigners competitive strategies are radically different. Foreign car manufacturers have poured millions into R&D and market research. As a result, they have developed a huge technological lead, and have a better understanding of American consumer tastes than Detroit does. Toyota has produced hybrids for over five years. Honda has already a prototype cell fueled car out on the road tested by several government and commercial auto fleets. Meanwhile, Detroit announces it will produce some hybrids next year. The problem is it is always next year.

Additionally, Detroit managers have this illusion that they will one day leapfrog the foreign competition through leadership in the cell-fueled technology. They forget that these technologies (hybrid, cell fuel) are incremental. It first takes one to have a good handle on hybrid technology to be capable to move on to cell fuel technology. In this horse race, the Japanese are way ahead. They have just about crossed the finish line, while Detroit has not quite crossed the starting one.

The author anticipates an ongoing decline of the American car industry. If Detroit managers have been in denial for over 30 years, what could possibly awaken them from their dumb stupor? Nothing.

Obviously, this book's title should not be taken literally. The city in Michigan will not "end" nor will (in all probability) the so-called Big Three corporations headquartered there (Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors) but none resembles what it was 40-50 years ago and each will no doubt undergo significant changes in decades to come. By the way, are there any Small Others?

Other reviewers have already noted this book's numerous flaws (e.g. errors of fact, dubious statistics, and typos) and disagree with Maynard about some of her opinions. No need to re-hash them here. My own reaction to her book is that it makes a useful contribution to our understanding of why the United States has lost its dominance in the the automotive industry. There are several reasons, many of which also explain foreign dominance in the consumer electronics industry. Of greatest interest to me are decisions and (yes) non-decisions by the Big Three's senior-level executives which aided and abetted the success of their German and Japanese competitors.

I was surprised to learn that foreign-owned companies have built 17 plants in the United States and employ 85,000 people to produce cars and trucks many of us assume to be "imports." The same vehicles consistently rank highest in terms of quality of construction and customer satisfaction, lowest in terms of frequency of repair. They are also among the most fuel efficient. So much for the highly-promoted campaign to "Buy American." Moreover, Honda and Toyota have an enormous head start in designing and producing hybrid and fuel-cell cars. The Big Three may not be dead and may never die but they certainly have serious problems which could well become worse. What about the Big Three's strategy to offer rebates and deep discounts? Their short-term benefits (other than to the consumer) may result in a spike in sales but almost wipe out dealers' margins and OEM's profits while creating bloated inventories of used vehicles.

My wife drives a Honda Accord and I a Nissan Altima. Although the purchase price of each was somewhat more than that of its US counterparts, our extensive research indicated that the total cost of both would be substantially less and that has proven to be true. Reliability is very important. Other than routine maintenance, our Honda and Altima have been care-free. We expect them to have a higher value than their counterparts would when we replace them.

Despite its deficiencies, Maynard's book addresses several important issues which have great significance and profound implications. The lessons to be learned from the Big Three's blunders during the past 20-25 years are directly relevant to all other US companies as they now struggle to compete profitably in the global marketplace.