Customer Reviews

The Pity Of War Explaining World War I

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Ferguson's book is interesting for its voluminous stats, fresh approach and determination to be controversial. Behind criticism of previous interpretations of the causes of the First World War, Ferguson mounts an inadequate case for various propositions. Often he advances contentions that are downright silly, Russia the most efficient war maker of 1914-1918 ? Russia, a country without adequate supplies of just about anything ? Where its soldiers were deprived of all the staples of war, and whose government abdicated its reponsibilities to the zemstvos ? Even more laughable is the idea that Germany and the Central Powers came out of the war comparatively lightly because of their debt portfolio in the 1920s. By being selective about the first hand accounts of the time, economic indicators, and the like the author purports to show a "new" picture of WW1. Some times he alludes to previous interpretations, uses selective evidence and "demolishes" them. It is not convincing. For example, he stresses economic reasons for the success of early recruitment in the UK which simultaneously depreciating emotional or patriotic reasons for the same. As I came from a country (i.e Australia) which sent 8% of its entire population overseas, including my grandfather,to fight in Europe without conscription or real economic encouragement, it is difficult to accept the economic explanation for the recruitment "boom" in 1914. Similarly, the remarkable level of recruitment in the "white" Dominions during the War is indicative of emotional, rather than commercial, reasons for volunteering. Whilst the author harps on Germany's inferior economic resources, lack of martial spirit and the preponderance of Entente force, he conveniently forgets the German advantages of interior lines of communication, superiority in training and organisation and position that effectively negated the Entente's advantage for four years. Where Ferguson fails, perhaps, most miserably, is his inability to effectively explain why the German Reich lost after the Kaiserschlacht. If the German Army was so effective, why did it after August 8, 1918 start to disintegrate ? John Terraine's explanation, in "To win a war", is both more satisfying and well-founded. The presence of US forces was not crucial, the actual numbers in the field were far inferior to the Anglo-French. Germany did not come out ahead after WW1, the political systems in France and the British Empire were relatively undisturbed yet in Germany the entire edifice of the State collapsed. Ferguson claims Britain lost more territory and wealth after the War than Germany by confusing the Irish settlement with the Versailles Treaty- which is mendacious. For a new persceptive of the economics of the war this book has some merit. For the attempt to re-define the conventional picture of a warlike Europe being propelled into armageddon by foolish error rather than deliberate aggression, the book also has some merit. However, for its "trendy" revisionist idea that somehow Britain caused the carnage of the War by saving France from inevitable defeat (and thus is somehow more "guilty" than Germany) this will simply not wash.

The world needs a lot more Niall Fergusons and Howard Zinns to rewrite history and eliminate historical lies taught in schools until today, especially but not only the Roman and US-history needs a lot of rewrite.

Ferguson does it again. One of the best historians of our generation applies his wits to THE tragic event of the twentieth century. In this extraordinary piece of scholarship you will learn about the "mechanisms" (both social, economic, political and diplomatic) behind WWI. If you want a general history about the war, that follows a strict timeline of the battles, without any analysis, read another book first. But if you want to think hard about the causes and effects of the Great War, there is no better place than the Pity of War.

Ferguson is not only an extraordinarily serious historian. The economics, sociology and military analysis in the book are first rate. A great contribution.

The book is full of well-argued points and is mostly convincing in its stated task (explaining WWI). But, all of that is of marginal significance compared to the section of the book titled 'The Joy of War?', which, to my mind, is the most correct and truthful answer to that big, old question "Why do men fight wars?"

Niall Ferguson got headlines for what would have otherwise been a book for specialists of World War I when he included arguments that Britain should not have entered the war. He acknowledged that this would have certainly meant the fall of France and the acquisition by Germany of territory in the East at the expense of Russia. His argument created a great stir in Britain, which (like France) suffered enormously high casualties in World War I, much worse than in the World War II. Ferguson's book is a thoroughly argued, revisionist approach to the War. He disputes everything from the importance patriotism and war fever played in the early rush of enlistments to whether the Allies were economically more efficient than the Central Powers. Do not buy this book expecting an easy read. Ferguson supports his arguments by large amounts of statistical studies that are daunting even to a reader familiar with the controversies surrounding the war. In the end, one is left with the belief that it could not have been a good thing for Germany to have eliminated France and Russia as world powers, which would have allowed it to build up its Navy in competition with Britain. Of course, there is one benefit that would have come from Germany winning World War I; with the German political structure intact and victorious, it seems certain that Adolph Hitler would have lived his days out in obscurity.
In short, this book is only for someone deeply interested in the economic and social history of World War I.

This is a great book that takes a look at the Western European world that opted for war in 1914. The chapters are very interesting and fact filled and in the end the book produces several conclusions that have caused heart attacks throughout out academia. My favorites:

1) Britain and the world would have benefitted greatly had she stayed out of WWI: i.e. less slaughter in WWI, no Nazi's or WWII and no death of the British Empire.

2) Germany would have formed some kind of early EU most likely because that would be the only logical way to administer Europe.

These two point seem to have really caused mass hysteria, even though they make a lot of sense when one considers the previous historical behaviours of the two Empires.

I would recommend that people also read Tanneberg: Clash of Empires (Showalter) and The German Wars (Goodspeed) if they want to understand a little bit more about the actual mind set of Germany and even Russia leading upto WWI. These books are a big help in making sense of what Ferguson is talking about.

From the same author I had already red "The Cash Nexus" and had been very favourably impressed both for the readability and the argument (usually a mix of history and economics, not just economic history).
Well, about the content, this is not the usual history of First World War.
It is an attempt to look behind the stage of historical events, to try to evaluate the actual outcome of the events on the light of the choices available to the "actors". Looking at what might have happened (and did not happen) can help to cast new light on the meaning of actual events.
The question "what... if" from which the inquiry starts, is a great stimulus for the reader not just to enjoy the book but also to evaluate the conclusions of the author.
I greatly enjoyed this book even if I do not agree with some of Ferguson theses.
In particular the critic to the common idea that a culture favourable to the world arise in the last decades of XIX century is a bit excessive (on the light of the thought and following of thinkers like Wagner, Nietzsche, Darwinism with the survival of the fittest,... not to speak about Futurism and the like).
I was also a bit unsettled by the allegations about the role of Keynes as a fifth German column in the discussions of war reparations: it may well be, but I believe the arguments used are a bit too personal (the alleged "possible" love affair with dr. Melchior) or overstated (this influence on British public opinion and government in the aftermath of the war).
Then, as a "continental" European I've been really upset by the argument that, after all, it would have been better if the Germans won the blitzkrieg and formed a kind of proto-common European Market... Right, it would have cost less in terms of lives. Right, the Greater Reich wouldn't be in competition with the British Empire... and right... we would probably have avoided II WW, but in what kind of world we would live today?

I was not expecting to like this book. In fact, I very nearly avoided it altogether based on the overwhelmingly negative reviews by some of the leading scholars of strategic studies. In a fascinating exchange on Slate.com in June 1999, Eliot Cohen (my academic advisor, mentor and good friend) and Paul Fussell competed with one another over which one disliked Ferguson's history more, describing his work alternatively as "smarty," "pedantic," "inane," and "irritating."

In the Summer 2001 issue of National Interest, Michael Howard, the doyen of war studies, was decidedly cool to the conclusions in The Pity of War, although not hostile to Ferguson' alternative approach, which he called "a refreshing variant on an otherwise sterile debate." In a separate 2001 interview Michael Howard claimed that the biggest breakthrough in the field of military history in his lifetime had been the "study of 'total history'; history studied in real depth and width."

It seems to me this is precisely what Ferguson's work provides and why it should be recommended. This is a book on war filled with charts and graphs showing the movement of bond prices, not battle maps showing the movement of divisions. If this book were written by a lesser talent, it would have been an embarrassing failure. But Ferguson writes extremely well and (perhaps more importantly given the recondite subject matter) his chapters are neatly laid out and his main points are clearly elucidated. Clearly elucidated -- and outlandish.

The book reads as if it were ghost-written by Alfred von Wegerer, the head of Germany's Center for the Study of the Causes of the War, a quasi-think tank offshoot of the War Guilt Section of the German Foreign Ministry in the 1920s and 30s whose sole mission was to spin the history of World War I in Germany's favor. First, he blames his native Britain for just about everything: diplomatic blundering that led to the start of the war; entry into the war that made it a global conflict; and a contribution to the war that made it stretch on for four long, miserable years. Second, he claims that a German victory would have just led to a benign, EU-like arrangment on the continent. Again, I say: It is the heterodox approach and perspective of this book that makes it well worth reading, not its iconoclastic message.

In closing, if you are looking for one book to read on the First World War, this is not the one to get. If, however, you are familiar with the subject and are looking for a book that will challenge your assumptions and perhaps make you rethink your understanding the seminal conflict of the twentieth century, The Pity of the War may be well-worth your time.

An easy read despite it's length. I found this book very compelling. The author is not a true expert on this subject and I've read some minor criticisms of this work. It's not in the style of a traditional history. Some of the details of the book come across as "gossipy" or journalistic. The book does shed light on the economics of the war, the problem of finding effective tactics, and the role of the media. Much is included in the book, but I wonder what was left out. If you haven't read a general history of the war in France already, you might want to before reading this book. Very clearly written, and exciting to read.

From the History Channel to Barbara Tuchman every account of World War I describes the ecstatic patriotic fervor that swept England, France, Russia, and Germany in August 1914. In fact, writes Ferguson, almost everyone was depressed by the outbreak of war - and he assembles contemporary newspaper accounts and memoirs to support this. Why did soldiers continue fighting, year after year, under awful conditions with no hope of victory and little hope of surviving? Because they loved it, Ferguson claims, and he points to evidence. He agrees the treaty of Versailles led directly to World War II but not because it was so vengeful. It was too generous, he maintains. It humiliated the Germans without punishing them. They paid little of the reparations (after their victory in 1870 Germany forced huge reparations on the French - and collected).

This is contrarian history of the best type: topsy-turvy interpretations by a brilliant writer who makes a genuine attempt to back them up. Experts quarrel with most of his points, but experts have read a great deal of history. Don't read this without doing the same.