Currently unavailable.
We don't know when or if this item will be back in stock.
Have one to sell?
Flip to back Flip to front
Listen Playing... Paused   You're listening to a sample of the Audible audio edition.
Learn more
See this image

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States

5.0 out of 5 stars 1 customer review

See all 11 formats and editions Hide other formats and editions
Amazon Price
New from Used from
Kindle Edition
"Please retry"

Harry Potter and the Cursed Child
--This text refers to the Paperback edition.
click to open popover

No Kindle device required. Download one of the Free Kindle apps to start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, and computer.
Getting the download link through email is temporarily not available. Please check back later.

  • Apple
  • Android
  • Windows Phone
  • Android

To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.

Product Details

  • Perfect Paperback: 480 pages
  • Publisher: Cornerstone (January 2011)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 1847940773
  • ISBN-13: 978-1847940773
  • Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars 1 customer review
  •  Would you like to update product info, give feedback on images, or tell us about a lower price?

Product Description


Slate, December 2010
"With those books, you'll never need to read anything that emerges from the FCIC. But if you do, read the good stuff: the interviews in which it grilled executives from Wall Street and the housing industry. The commission called in the loan-makers and bankers that caused the crisis and forced them to answer questions about their businesses—all for the public record. (It also subpoenaed thousands of pages of documents from Wall Street firms, though it is not clear if it will make those public.) There's no need to get the narrative from the FCIC. But if you want, say, to hear former Lehman CEO Dick Fuld try to defend himself, that's the place to go.”

NPR’s Morning Edition
“The majority report reads a lot like a book, and a bit of a potboiler at that. The commission conducted hundreds of hours of interviews, with industry insiders, policymakers, whistle-blowers and regulators. And the pages of the majority's report are strewn with quotes from these interviews — foreboding, eye-popping quotes.”

New York Times, February 2, 2011
“The report is full of fascinating information, rich detail and fine documentary evidence.”
New York Times, January 30, 2011
”The report still makes for compelling reading because so little has changed as a result of the debacle, in both banking and in its regulation.”
Minneapolis Star-Tribune, January 29, 2011
“At 662 pages, the FCIC report amounts to a sweeping forensic examination of a crisis that the commission says could have been avoided. The conclusions are written with style and infused with an appropriate tone of outrage, buttressed by more than 700 interviews (including one with Minnesota lawyer Prentiss Cox) and millions of documents.”
New York Times, February 13, 2011
“full of fascinating detail”

New York Times
, February 17, 2011
“Actually, the report — and the online archive of testimony, interviews and documents that are now available — is a treasure trove of invaluable information about the causes and consequences of the Great Recession.”
New York Review of Books, April 28, 2011
“The most comprehensive indictment of the American financial failure that has yet been made…The definitive history of this period.”
Forbes, April 18, 2011
“The report is very comprehensive, is well written and provides study material for much more extensive analysis.”

CHOICE, August 2011
 “Anyone interested in studying the causes of the financial crisis that reached a critical mass in 2008 must read this report… It is a Herculean research effort that deserves recognition.”

--This text refers to the Paperback edition.

About the Author

In the course of its research and investigation, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reviewed millions of pages of documents, interviewed more than 700 witnesses, and held 19 days of public hearings in New York, Washington, D.C., and communities across the country that were hard hit by the crisis. The Commission also drew from a large body of existing work about the crisis developed by congressional committees, government agencies, academics, journalists, legal investigators, and many others. The Commission conducted research into broad and sometimes arcane subjects, such as mortgage lending and securitization, derivatives, corporate governance, and risk management. To bring these subjects out of the realm of the abstract, it conducted case study investigations of specific financial firms and in many cases specific facets of these institutions that played pivotal roles. Those institutions included American International Group (AIG), Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Moody s, and Wachovia. The Commission also looked more generally at the roles and actions of scores of other companies. The Commission studied relevant policies put in place by successive Congresses and administrations. It also examined the roles of policy makers and regulators, including at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (and its successor, the Federal Housing Finance Agency), the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Treasury Department. --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

See all Product Description

Customer Reviews

5.0 out of 5 stars
5 star
4 star
3 star
2 star
1 star
See the customer review
Share your thoughts with other customers

Top Customer Reviews

Format: Paperback Verified Purchase
The pleasant surprise that came with reading this congressional account of the investigation into the financial meltdown was that yes, elected officials can write a truthful disclosure based on the obvious cover up provided by the testimony presented by the robber barons summoned to Wershington to explain their actions.

The detail of the testimony provided and additional insights provided within the book are clearly well above the narrative provided by the many first hand participants and journalists who have since attempted to spin their own stories of the events that shook the financial world.

After watching the many hours of testimony on television the account of the proceedings is equally accurate in print as what the impartial observer saw on CSPAN or the nightly news.

The mandate of the Commission to provide an account not solutions of what happened is overcome with the conclusions presented at the very beginning of this report. The dissenting opinions at the end of the report provides a contrasting and useful summary that in large measure reflects the continuing stalemate of building consensus across party lines in Congressional budget debates.

Overall for the economic historian the volume provides a useful history of events that should provide future generations dealing with similar economic meltdowns useful parallels of how quickly financial markets can collapse. It also reinforces that government regulators generally are the last to know but the first group looked to for answers. The lack of foresight by those who were supposed to regulate the dealings of the financial firms is clearly developed as one reads the findings and many pages in the report.
Read more ›
One person found this helpful. Was this review helpful to you? Yes No Sending feedback...
Thank you for your feedback.
Sorry, we failed to record your vote. Please try again.
Report abuse

Most Helpful Customer Reviews on (beta) HASH(0xa8a35d50) out of 5 stars 42 reviews
59 of 68 people found the following review helpful
HASH(0xa8ffec24) out of 5 stars A decent generalist - level survey of all the factors behind the financial crisis Jan. 28 2011
By MT57 - Published on
Format: Paperback
I would describe the book as really two books. The first 40% or so is more of an analysis of developments in economy and finance over the 20 or so years leading up to the crisis of 08, and the last 60% is more of a narrative of the events of the crisis in the last half of 08. The latter portion heavily reminded me of Sorkin's book, Too Big to Fail. It similarly relies heavily on interviews with high level executives, officials and so on. I understand that, if you are trying to write something that you want the general public to read, you would opt for the chronological narrative of the second half of the report. However, having read Sorkin's book, I felt a little frustrated that there was little added insight here, considering the time, resources and investigative power the commission had.

As far as the analysis goes, it is decent enough if not particularly dazzling. There aren't a lot of surprises here if you have followed the issue over the past 2-3 years. There is nothing like the explosive effect of the Pecora report in the 1930's, on which this commission was modeled. I think that is in part due to the much more active media we now have now; compared to the 1930's, so much in here has come out more or less already.

The only real function that the analytical section performs is to package up what has already been disclosed and assert in a general way what weight should be given to what cause(s). Every factor gets mentioned and given some role; the different political appointees on the commission apparently disagree over how much weight should be given which factors. Although there seems to be a good deal of conversation about that disagreement in the blogosphere, having now read the report, it was frankly a little too general to me, and I have more sympathy for the dissenter who said, in effect, "if everything is a cause, nothing is". Although everything does get mentioned, a number of areas go unexplored in detail. For instance, on page 6, the report notes "The time-tested 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, with a 20% down payment,
went out of style." But they never really explore why (fixed rate loans went out of style due to interest rate volatility in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the down payment threshold was lowered for two reasons, (1) in the 1980s, advocates for expanding home ownership, such as ACORN, targeted that kind of mortgage as too restrictive, associated it with "redlining" and racism, and pushed for a lowering of origination standards to expand home ownership and (2) real estate developers lobbied for obvious reasons for the lowered downpayment).

The analysis section is a blend of organization by topic and by chronological narrative. This makes it relatively easy to read. However, it might have been more in keeping with the purpose of the commission, as I understand it, to have been less concerned with general readability and provide more quantitative analysis on each topic. I would have loved to have seen something more incisive, although it may be the nature of a commission report that throwing everything in is needed to get even 6 of the 10 to agree on the final text. It took decades for the economics profession to come up with a coherent evidenced account of the causes of the Great Depression, by which I mean Milton Friedman's, and perhaps that is just going to be the case here as well.

I felt the report does not display a good understanding of several areas that were particularly relevant. The chapter on Lehman, for example, begins with statements by the commission about valuation that are excruciating to read if you have worked on valuation analysis (valuation is an opinion about what something will bring in a particular context and thus valuations differ based on the context, especially depending on whether the context is one of an orderly market and orderly marketing into it, or if you are assuming a forced sale in a disorderly market). Similarly, they do not understand CDS's well at all. When they repeatedly describe AIG's CDS's as "new fangled" and so on, they demonstrate that superficial understanding. Credit default swaps are simply a means of credit insurance and financial institutions have been writing credit insurance since the Renaissance if not earlier, just with different documentation. That said, the commission does correctly understand the difference here was that AIG's CDS's were not written by a regulated insurer or financial institution that had to reserve capital against the exposure. At the same time, since regulators repeatedly and systematically failed, as the report says, where they did have jurisdiction, it is not clear that the mere fact of CDS regulation would have changed the outcome for AIG.

The report reads as if someone who wanted to be a novelist or journalist but was not very good was given responsibility for the final draft. There are too many passages that read like someone's attempt to spice things up for the sake of spicing them up. E.g. after laying out an analysis by Paul Krugman on the role of foreign capital in fueling the housing bubble, the report adds a one sentence paragraph: "It was an ocean of money". What a useful observation, huh?

In sum, I think the report is a fine generalist-level survey of the factors behind the financial crisis although not a source of much additional insight.
38 of 50 people found the following review helpful
HASH(0xa8ffecfc) out of 5 stars UNREADABLE PRINT!! Feb. 1 2011
By Bob C - Published on
Format: Paperback Verified Purchase
WARNING: The print size and quality of this publication will make it unreadable to many people (as it is for me).

The main font is tiny, and the font for the footnotes is vanishingly small. The cheap printing method has also resulted in a font with very low contrast. A further problem is that the margins are narrow even near the spine, so the lines of print curve out of sight as you try to read them.

I am able to read all sorts of books and have reading glasses to do so, yet I am unable to read this book. The Amazon entry for this book should warn potential purchasers of the readability issue.

Unfortunately, the version of the report from the Government Printing Office uses the same format. This is a travesty.

For many people, the best choice at present is to download the entire report for free (as a single PDF). On screen, the print size can be adjusted at will. That is how I intend to read the report. If I need to excerpt some pages, I can print them from the PDF. Pages printed from the PDF at least have excellent contrast, even though there is no way to adjust the font size. The report can be downloaded here: [...]

In addition to the readability issue, potential purchasers should be aware that this Authorized Edition from PublicAffairs does not include the index to the report. The index must be downloaded (as a PDF) from the publisher's website.
28 of 38 people found the following review helpful
HASH(0xa8f6e078) out of 5 stars Dances around the fundamental cause-Completely unregulated speculation in derivatives Feb. 4 2011
By Michael Emmett Brady - Published on
Format: Paperback
This report spends over 500 hundred pages to reach a conclusion that basically targets the rating agencies as the main culprit in the economic collapse that is now referred to as the Great Recession.The real problem was the passage of legislation that eliminated the firewalls erected in the mid 1930's to prevent what happened .Three major problems can be identified.It is clear that if these three types of events had not occurred,then the Great Recession could have been prevented.

The three major factors making the Great Recession inevitable were (a) the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act(GS) of 1933 in 1999 , (b) the passage of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000,and (c) the planned and organized restructuring of the American banking system ,started by Jimmy Carter in 1978,to create megasized banks through periodic waves of mergers,acquisitions and takeovers.It should be emphasized that the major supporters of these actions in the late 1980's to 2000 were Bill and Hilary Clinton,F D Raines,Rubin ,Summers, Senator Dodd,Barney Frank,Senator Schumer and the usual array of Libertarian Republican supporters of Wall Street casino capitalism ,such as Phil and Wendy Gramm.Repealing Glass Steagall allowed the private commercial banks to again set up investment bank units to engage in financial speculation.This was the primary problem that occurred in the mid to late 1920's.Highly speculative,leveraged ,margin account loans financed the stock market bubble while balloon payment loan financing of mortgages created the bubble in housing.This double bubble led directly to the Great Depression of the 1930's. The same type of double bubble led to the Great Recession of the 2000's,as well. The Japanese Great Recession of 1993-2004 was also the direct result of a double bubble in real estate and stocks.

The CFMA removed derivatives and credit default swaps(CDS's) from any regulation at the state and federal level.Derivatives,CDS's and CDO's(Collateralized Debt Obligations)played the role in the 2000's that margin account financing of stock options had played in the 1920's.The subprime mortgage loans game ,along with the constant efforts of Countrywide Financial and Ameriquest to convert the fixed rate mortgages of low income citizens to adjustable rate mortgages by constant refinancing,played the role of the balloon payments game of the 1920's .
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
HASH(0xa8f6e594) out of 5 stars Pretty disappointing Feb. 5 2011
By Amy Lamar - Published on
Format: Paperback
Like many, I have been following the parapatetic hearings of the FCIC over the past year, and while I didn't expect this report to be completely earthshattering, I also didn't it expect it to be so mediocre in terms of analyzing the myriad problems and, more importantly, recommending legislative, regulatory, and structural solutions. The only conclusion the report seems to draw, in the end, is "this is probably going to happen again," which is borderline pathetic. I wish the commissioners and staff had read some of the classics published in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash--like The Great Crash 1929 or Krugman's The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 and especially the original blueprint for this kind of commission report, Stock Exchange Practices: The Final Report of the Pecora Commission which at least makes for highly entertaining reading. Hopefully this won't be the last inquiry into the 2008 meltdown undertaken by the government. What we really need is a "truth and reconciliation" commission, to bring out ALL the facts and come to grips with what we REALLY need to do to make sure systemic weaknesses are addressed, and regulations (and regulators) in place to police the inevitable simple human greed and irrationality.
HASH(0xa8f6e5ac) out of 5 stars A great reference on what happened Feb. 17 2014
By Paul 1946 - Published on
Format: Paperback Verified Purchase
I bought this for the same reasons I got the 911 official inquiry report. I read that tome cover to cover. Truth is the first few chapters will give you all you need to know. Also, I don't understand the complaints on the print size, it is pretty standard size print for a book this size. It is very readable and I wear bifocals.