Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness Paperback – Feb 2 2010
Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought
No Kindle device required. Download one of the Free Kindle apps to start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, and computer.
Getting the download link through email is temporarily not available. Please check back later.
To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.
“Provocative and lucid . . . Certainly, many of the scientists cited by Noë would disagree with his interpretations, but that's part of what makes this book so important: It's an audacious retelling of the standard story, an exploration of the mind that questions some of our most cherished assumptions about what the mind is.” ―Jonah Lehrer, San Francisco Chronicle
“Noë is an alluring writer.” ―Ruth Levy Guyer, The Washington Post
“Noë's conversational style is gentle, attentive and easygoing. But, in true philosopher fashion, he also picks his words deliberately, as if stepping off the path of right thinking would result in some tragic plummet into the abyss of illogic.” ―Gordy Slack, Salon
“I found Out of Our Heads to be a refreshingly clear, well-written, and satisfyingly slim book that reveals serious limitations in the mainstream academic approach to studying the nature of consciousness.” ―Dean Radin, Shift
“As a neurologist, confronted every day by questions of mind, self, consciousness, and their basis, I find Alva Noë's concepts--that consciousness is an organismic and not just a cerebral quality, that it is embodied in actions and not just isolated bits of brain--both astounding and convincing. Out of Our Heads is a book that should be read by everyone who thinks about thinking.” ―Oliver Sacks, Professor of Neurology and Psychiatry, Columbia University Medical Center
“A provocative and insightful book that will force experts and students alike to reconsider their grasp of current orthodoxy. Out of Our Heads is a vivid, clear, and very knowledgeable critique of some of the main ideas in cognitive science, and those of us who disagree with some of its main conclusions have our work cut out for us.” ―Daniel C. Dennett, Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University
“This book blows a breath of fresh air into the debates about consciousness and the brain. You are not your brain; you are your body, brain, and world dynamically intertwined. Consciousness is not a solo performance by the brain; it's a partner dance our living bodies enact in concert with the world. If you think the brain is the beginning and end of the story about consciousness, you need to get out of your head and read this book!” ―Evan Thompson, Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto
“As colorful and hard-hitting as its title suggests, Out of Our Heads is an important and provocative work that challenges some of the deepest assumptions guiding the contemporary scientific study of conscious experience.” ―Andy Clark, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Edinburgh University
“Alva Noë makes a powerful and persuasive case for the view that a several-centuries-old picture of the mind as an entity ‘inside the head' has misled both lay and scientific thought about the nature of consciousness and, more broadly, the nature of the mind-world relation. Ranging over topics in philosophy, psychology, and neurology, the chapters of this book combine sophistication and availability to a general reader. His alternative to the misleading picture is nontrivial, and while his views are sure to be controversial, most of what he says is true, and all of it is original and important to think about.” ―Hilary Putnam, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
“Readers interested in how science can intersect with and profit from philosophy will find much food for thought in Noë's groundbreaking study.” ―Publishers Weekly
“Illuminating . . . An invaluable contribution to cognitive science and the branch of self-reflective philosophy extending back to Descartes' famous maxim, ‘I think, therefore I am.'” ―Carl Hays, Booklist
About the Author
Alva Noë is a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he is also a member of the Institute for Cognitive and Brain Science. His previous book, Action in Perception, was published in 2004.
What Other Items Do Customers Buy After Viewing This Item?
Top Customer Reviews
a proper definition of consciousness. Science asks what it is, philosphy asks how we should think about it. It is not to be thought of as electro-chemical impulses in the brain, but an an integral and essential entity made up of perception, interpretation, (memory, emotion and reason)determined largely by our environment. Even conjoined twins have a distinct consciousness, because of context. The word context appears late in the book; it might better have appeared in the beginning.
A very good portrayal of our awareness, but leaving out the three- dimensional aspects of body soul AND spirit. Spirit fills the gap and makes humans whole.
Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta)
We often take for granted in brain science that the mind is implemented by things happening inside the skull. That goes against the growing findings that perception is an active process of exploration that depends on our contact with the real world and the skills we possess for navigating its structure. This book takes on the significant challenge of bringing that difficult idea accessibly and non-technically into the popular mind and I think he does an excellent job.
Although Noe doesn't talk about it specifically, Ruth Millikan makes a good related argument that substance categories are really skills. We know substances by our skills for finding and identifying them over and over, not through their intrinsic properties. Noe approaches perception in much the same way. We know the world by interacting with it, not by (or in addition to?) simulating it with detailed models inside our head.
Noe goes a step further and points out how some concepts just don't make from a detached viewpoint, so we are often forced to destroy the phenomena of consciousness, reducing them to something else, in order to study them dispassionately. This is a tough sell, I think, to habitual materialists, but he doesn't rely too heavily on it.
The implication Noe emphasizes is that consciousness is a process involving interaction of the nervous system with the world, not (just) something that is lighting up inside our neural nets. The distinction is sometimes more subtle that Noe acknowledges. He approves of Gibson's ecological theory of perception, but doesn't address the equally important work on expectancy and hypothesis testing approaches to perception, such as Richard Gregory's ideas and the experimental work done around them.
He is probably right that much of our basic perception relies heavily on active engagement with the world, but then some of it, to me, clearly doesn't. He does a good job showing limits to the feature detection approach to vision (doesn't it beg the question to say that features are "built up" toward pictures in the brain?), but doesn't have an alternate explanation for the elaborate architecture of columns and receptor fields and their activity in dreaming and imagination that seem to support at least some version of the mental representation concept in some kinds of mental activity. It seems in places that Noe acknowledges this sort of work but considers it an impoverished-perceptual or non-perceptual kind of mental activity.
Other than the excellent writing and clear arguments, the best part of this book is the skillful use of various findings regarding phantom limbs, sensory illusions, and inattention phenomena to illustrate the empirical implications of a mind extended beyond the brain case. Even if you don't buy the full externalist argument in all its details, it's hard to read those examples and not have a little light go off in your head and think "oh, so that's what he means by the mind being outside the brain!" That's a mark of good writing.
Noe mentions but does not dwell on the role played by philosopher J Merleau-Ponty in many of these ideas, and his work is worth exploring as well. A good non-technical intro in keeping with the spirit of Noe's book is: Merleau-ponty: A Guide for the Perplexed (Guides for the Perplexed).
This book is a good read, a relatively quick read, and very thought provoking.
But Noe's single-minded focus on the role of active engagement in everyday-life phenomenology leads him to overstate his own case.
It isn't clear, for example, why an organism's active engagement with its environment, a precondition for normal perception, should count toward a definitive account of "consciousness", while model-building neural activity in the brain shouldn't, unless you're simply assuming about consciousness what you wish to prove, i.e., that it isn't in any way its neurological correlates.
Noe also goes too far in his insistence on environmental engagement as a necessary precondition for consciousness. One of his own examples - patients with locked-in syndrome - brings this out. While Noe uses such cases of radical immobility to argue for the unreliability of brain scans, such cases also clearly illustrate consciousness can exist in a state approaching that of a brain in a vat. (It's not much of stretch to imagine the body functions that support the brain in such tragic cases being replaced with artificial supports, presumably with the patient continuing to remain aware despite no outward sign of consciousness.)
The brain is far from the whole story of consciousness, which can be studied from multiple historical, biological and humanist perspectives, all of which shed light on its development and nature. But Noe's insistence that consciousness requires present active engagement with the world is either an overstatement or a re-definition by fiat.
My own sense, and I don't have it well developed, is that we need to go further out, and begin to see mind as including what Durkheim called "social facts". I doubt it will happen soon, due to our delusions of atomism in the social world. We seem to be stuck with the idea that each of us is, say, a pool ball, complete with mind and brain, and that we bounce around, hitting the cushions or each other, and have no enduring connections with any. Noe makes a start toward working out the goofiness of that view.
Second, I don't see how a sensori-motor conception of behavior eliminates the brain. This seems like a retread of reductionist behaviorism.
While I agree with the general thrust of embodied consciousness -- observing how an organism interacts with the environment, rather than passively receives information from the environment -- is generally correct, this does not eliminate the brain, nor the wide variety of approaches that brain scientist use. It makes the project more challenging and interesting.
Finally, try as I might, I don't understand how Noe defines consciousness. It seems like hand-waving. And, like virtually every other attempt to explain first-person consciousness, it either denies its existence (unlikely) or performs magic.
To make it as easy as possible, I'll start with this: If you truly care about learning about cognitive science, investigating some of the scientific implications of phenomenology (which is a philosophical and not-strictly-scientific field), steer clear of this book. If you already know the basics of philosophy of mind, steer clear of this book. Not that the book is necessarily bad, but if you really value and want to learn about these things, you will find it a bit simplistic and insubstantial. You could try Noe's other books, and if you haven't already read it, you could try Thomas Nagel's "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" which is actually a 20-ish page essay, and a gem of an essay at that. Just Google it in quotes. You could also try Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who is a relatively accessible philosopher from whom Noë takes a great many cues.
This is the kind of book that opts for endnotes rather than footnotes, and which just gives page references for endnotes, rather than blocking the page up with superscript references to other texts you don't care about anyway. It's also the kind of book that makes liberal use of in-text exclamation points and cute phrases like "the snap, crackle, and pop of conscious experience." It makes things easy to read, but this comes at the expense of intellect. If you're brand new to the cognitive science trend, it means Noë wrote the book to serve as your introduction, and went out of his way to make it digestible, uncomplicated, and not especially academic. Basically, it's for beginners, and Noë wants to sell you his ideas in a non-intimidating way. This is fairly complicated stuff, after all, so there's no shame in starting with an accessible introduction. Again: not bad, but not for everyone.
There's also the title, specifically: the subtitle. "Lessons from the biology of consciousness" is somewhat misleading since this book isn't really about biology. It's about cognitive science, which is a new-ish hybrid of philosophy and neuroscience, neuroscience being, of course, a branch of biology. But since it's a branch with it's own specific name, I don't see a good reason not to use it. I have the sneaking suspicion that Noë (or, to be fair, maybe his more commercially-interested publisher) chose "biology of consciousness" over more specific terms like "neuroscience" or "cognitive science" as a way of selling the book to people who aren't sure what those terms mean, who might be intimidated by them, or who might scoff at them outright. This is, again, a nod to the beginner's market.
If you know your basics philosophy- or science-wise, the content of the book is more than a little misleading as well. It seems like a lot of what Noë does is construct Cartesian straw men and build arguments against them. No self-respecting neuroscientist actually thinks of the brain as a dualistic sort of computer or that it's operationally separate from its environment, and no self-respecting thinker takes Descartes seriously. Noë doesn't really need to convince anyone of these things, but his attempts to do so wind up with him making common-sense statements like "We couldn't [see] if we had no brain, but we couldn't do it if there were no objects, either." Another favorite of mine is: "What I am saying is that the question of consciousness arises for living beings," as if he needs to clarify whether or not the question of consciousness arises for non-living beings. Thanks, Noë.
The upshot: as a creative writer, I took several interesting points and applicable ideas from this book, but I wish I had gotten them from "Action in Perception" or "Varieties of Presence" instead.
Look for similar items by category
- Books > Health, Fitness & Dieting > Psychology & Counseling > Cognitive
- Books > Health, Fitness & Dieting > Psychology & Counseling > Neuropsychology
- Books > Health, Fitness & Dieting > Psychology & Counseling > Philosophy of Psychology
- Books > Medical Books > Medicine > Internal Medicine > Neurology > Neuroscience
- Books > Politics & Social Sciences > Philosophy > Consciousness & Thought
- Books > Professional & Technical > Professional Science > Behavioural Sciences > Cognitive Psychology
- Books > Professional & Technical > Professional Science > Behavioural Sciences > Cognitive Science
- Books > Science & Math > Behavioural Sciences > Cognitive Psychology
- Books > Science & Math > Medicine > Internal Medicine > Neurology > Neuroscience